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This thesis relates to the usage of trust modelling in multi-agent systems – environments
in which there are interacting software agents representing various users (for example,
buyers and sellers exchanging products and services in an electronic marketplace). In
such applications, trust modelling may be crucial to allow one group of agents (in the
e-commerce scenario, buyers) to make effective decisions about which other agents (i.e.,
sellers) are the most appropriate partners. A number of existing multi-agent trust models
have been proposed in the literature to help buyers accurately select the most trustworthy
sellers.
Our contribution is to propose several modifications that can be applied to existing
probabilistic multi-agent trust models. First, we examine how the accuracy of the model
can be improved by limiting the network to a portion of the population consisting of the
most trustworthy agents, such that the less trustworthy contributions of the remaining
agents can be ignored. In particular, we explore how this can be accomplished by either
setting a maximum size for a buyer’s advisor network or setting a minimum trustworthiness
threshold for agents to be accepted into that advisor network, and develop methods for
appropriately selecting the values to limit the network size. We demonstrate that for
two models, both the Personalized Trust Model (PTM) developed by Zhang as well as
TRAVOS, these approaches will yield significant improvements to the accuracy of the
trust model, as opposed to using an unrestricted advisor network.
Our final proposed modification is to use an advisor referral system in combination
with one of the network-limiting approaches. This would ensure that if a particular agent
within the advisor network had not met a specified level of experience with the seller
under consideration, it could be replaced by another agent that had greater experience
with that seller, which should in turn allow for a more accurate modelling of the seller’s
trustworthiness. We present a particular approach for replacing advisors, and show that
this will yield additional improvements in trust-modelling accuracy with both PTM and
TRAVOS, especially if the limiting step were such that it would yield a very small advisor
network.
v
We believe that these techniques will be very useful for trust researchers seeking to
improve the accuracy of their own trust models, and to that end we explain how other
researchers could apply these modifications themselves, in order to identify the optimal
parameters for their usage. We discuss as well the value of our proposals for identifying
an “optimal” size for a social network, and the use of referral systems, for researchers in
other areas of artificial intelligence.
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Within the broad field of artificial intelligence, much recent work has been devoted to
intelligent agents, or software-based entities that are capable of making their own decisions
autonomously, often with reference to changes in their environment and interactions with
other agents [36]. Environments in which several such agents exist and interact with one
another are called multi-agent systems [10].
In these systems, trust often plays an important role. Individual agents may act in
their own self-interest to maximize their benefits from the system, and in some cases they
attempt to do so through deception or by providing misinformation to other agents. It
is thus critical that agents are able to accurately determine the trustworthiness of other
agents. While “trust” may often have different meanings from one domain to the next [24],
for the purposes of our discussion, our work makes use of the definition of “trust” as an
agent’s belief that some other agent will carry out the tasks it says it will perform [42].
While we believe that the proposals and findings presented herein will be applicable
to a number of different scenarios, we will be grounding our discussion in one particularly
pertinent application, specifically electronic commerce, in which customers may shop for
and purchase goods or services from sellers over the Internet, even though the buyer and
the seller may be separated geographically by a long distance. Each buyer and each seller
would be represented by an intelligent agent, reasoning about which partners to select, to
conduct business.
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Regardless of the source from which a customer chooses to purchase items, there is
always a need for some element of trust that the seller will carry through on the promise
to deliver the purchased items. When purchasing directly from a large, well-known retailer
like Amazon.com (http://www.amazon.com/ ), this trust is usually more implicit because
that retailer has already derived a reputation from selling items to consumers over a num-
ber of years. In other cases, however, such as purchases through the electronic-auction
marketplace eBay (http://www.ebay.com/ ) – and for certain goods on Amazon that are
not stocked by the company itself, e.g. out-of-print books – the website is merely acting
as an intermediary for some other person or company. In such cases the customer will
typically need to pay much more attention to the seller’s reputation to ensure that he or
she is not being taken advantage of.
1.1 Trust Modelling
Trust modelling is a field of artificial intelligence focusing on determining the trustwor-
thiness of agents. This is typically conducted in contexts where a requesting agent is
considering interacting with a providing agent, and is based on the information about the
providing agent that is available to the requesting agent. It is especially pertinent with
regards to multi-agent systems such as electronic marketplaces, in which customers (or
buyers) often need to decide whether a seller is sufficiently trustworthy to purchase goods
or services, and several recent researchers in the field have focused on this application
[39][33][43].
Some of the initial work in the area defined this information solely in terms of the
direct past interactions between the requesting agent and the agents under consideration
[20][33]. However, more contemporary systems also consider the availability of information
from other agents that might be able to better inform the initial agent – we refer to these
agents as advisors, as they may provide advice to the initial agent about an item (or,
indeed, another agent) of interest. This additional information is particularly pertinent on
sites such as eBay, which computes reputation scores for each seller based on the ratings
assigned by different buyers for each interaction.
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In regards to multi-agent trust models, our focus in this thesis will be on the subcategory
of probabilistic models. By “probabilistic” we mean that the models in question make use
of probability density functions (pdfs) in order to estimate the trustworthiness of providing
agents. Most commonly the pdf used is the beta probability distribution function, which is
used to represent probability distributions associated with binary events, indexed by two
parameters α and β. In essence, it is used to compute the relative likelihood of the values
for some probability parameter p given fixed parameters α and β. This function may be
expressed as follows [13]:
beta(p|α, β) = Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
pα−1(1− p)β−a (1.1)
where Γ is the gamma function, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, and α, β > 0. The α and β parameters
define the shape of the density function when plotted, and are generally defined in terms
of the numbers of positive results and negative results, respectively [32][42], as will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
Probabilistic models that have been previously documented include the Beta Repu-
tation System [13], the TRAVOS model [32], and the Personalized Trust Model (PTM)
offered by Zhang [43], the latter of which is geared primarily towards electronic market-
place, whereas the first two are more general. All three of these models make use of beta
pdfs. We will discuss two of these models, PTM and TRAVOS, in greater detail in Chapter
2.
This thesis documents our work, the aims of which are twofold. The first is to improve
the accuracy of such multi-agent trust modelling systems. While many of the existing
trust models seem to provide excellent results in accurately modelling the trustworthiness
of agents, there is some room for improvement, which we address with our proposals.
The other aim is to work towards finding the “ideal” size of a requesting agent’s social
network of advisors. In this context, an agent’s social network is a collection of the other
agents which directly interact with the first agent. This does not imply, however, that
the physical individuals whom those agents represent necessarily have any knowledge of
one another. Indeed, the techniques we outline in this thesis are not at all affected by any
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friendships or other direct relationships, or lack thereof, between individuals; it has little in
common with social networking websites like Facebook (http://www.facebook.com/ ). For
this reason, we also refer to this concept as the agent’s neighbourhood or advisor network.
It has been previously noted [9][42] that having a larger number of advisors will increase
the computation time required to calculate these advisors’ trustworthiness, and may indeed
result in poorer accuracy in predicting the trustworthiness of provider agents, due to the
inclusion of additional “outlier” data. At the same time, while using a smaller number
of advisors may improve the accuracy somewhat, those advisors may not have a sufficient
level of experience. We therefore need to determine an appropriate “sweet spot” – not too
large and not too small – that will provide us with the most reliable results.
We first examine two methods that limit the size of a requesting agent’s advisor network.
Specifically, we consider selecting a maximum number (or maximum proportion) of advisors
(or max nbors) out of the total advisor population, or only selecting advisors that have
achieved some trustworthiness threshold.
We show that by using these methods – with appropriately-chosen parameters – to
limit the size of the advisor network, we will obtain an overall more accurate measure of
the trustworthiness of individual agents that the requesting agent is considering. We thus
also look at how to best determine the parameters to use for a given scenario, in order
to ensure the more accurate trust-modelling results. We further show that these results
should not be specific to any single model or scenario.
We then discuss the augmentation of one of these two techniques with a referral system,
in which advisors which have had an insufficient amount of experience with a particular
agent will be replaced by other agents with a higher level of experience. We show that care-
ful application of our proposed advisor referral system will result in further improvements
in trust modelling accuracy, particularly when the advisor network is initially very small,
such as when a small maximum number of advisors or a high trustworthiness threshold is
used. As with the earlier methods, we also examine how to determine the most appropriate
parameters when using advisor referrals.
As we explain further in Chapter 2, some researchers have previously looked at tech-
niques, either in trust modelling or related fields such as collaborative filtering, that to some
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extent resemble those that we propose in this thesis [9][40]. We believe the value of our
work lies in not merely providing improvements to the use of these techniques within trust
modelling, but also in setting out a more comprehensive procedure for carefully applying
those techniques. This procedure will ultimately demonstrate how to best determine an
appropriate size for a social network of this type.
1.2 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, we provide an overview of some of the earlier work that directly influences
our contributions in this thesis. Specifically, we outline the PTM as well as TRAVOS to
provide context to our proposals and to the examples and experiments which follow. We
then summarize the literature with regards to limiting network size, as well as referral
systems, in other domains.
Chapter 3 discusses our two proposals for limiting the size of advisor networks: setting
a maximum size to the advisor network (or max nbors), and trustworthiness thresholding.
We outline how these techniques would be applied to the PTM, and later provide a general
overview of how they could be applied to other trust models. We also provide demonstrative
examples of how these techniques function and how they affect the trust models that are
produced. Finally we provide experimental results demonstrating the effectiveness of these
techniques with both PTM and TRAVOS using moderately-sized advisor populations, as
well as with PTM when the advisor population is larger. Included here is an examination
of the use of random selection to overcome performance issues sometimes associated with
large populations.
Similarly, in Chapter 4 we outline our proposal for advisor referrals in combination with
max nbors or thresholding, and their application to the PTM and, potentially, to other
trust systems. We then continue with the examples and experimental results begun in the
previous chapter with specific reference to the effectiveness of advisors in both PTM and
TRAVOS. This includes an exploration using PTM for large population sizes as well.
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This is followed in Chapter 5 by some discussion of the value of our particular approach
and its implications for other researchers. Included is a suggested method of applying our
techniques to other trust models, an exploration of some of the outstanding questions
related to choosing appropriate parameters in our approach, and an investigation of alter-
native methods for weighting advisor referrals which may be used within our framework.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we outline some potential future work that could follow from our





2.1.1 Personalized Trust Model (PTM)
We ground this work, initially, in the multi-stage “personalized” trust modelling approach
developed by Zhang for representing reputation in an e-commerce system [43]. This ap-
proach, which for brevity we will refer to as the Personalized Trust Model or PTM, is
summarized below.
Buyer agents regularly interact with seller agents to purchase desired goods or services.
Following each transaction with a seller, a buyer assigns a rating to that transaction,
specifying whether its experience was positive (1) or negative (0) – more fine-grained
ratings are not provided for at present in the PTM – and submits this rating to a centralized
database server of some kind.
A single buyer agent, denoted by b, may wish to model the trustworthiness of all the
sellers in the system, in order to determine which sellers to purchase from in the future.
To do so, it first constructs a measure of the private reputation of each of the other
buyer agents – that is, b’s advisors – based on the advisors’ ratings for sellers that b has
previously dealt with, as retrieved from this central server, and representing an estimation
of the probability that an advisor a will give fair ratings to b.
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For each seller s for which both b and a have submitted ratings, there will be a corre-
sponding pair of ratings, which may be classified as either positive if the ratings are the
same (i.e. both ‘0’ or both ‘1’), or negative if the two ratings differ. Each pair of ratings
considered is assigned a weight based on the amount of time that separates the submission
of the two ratings using a “forgetting factor”, λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1), such that a pair of ratings
will have a greater weight if they are made within close time proximity. The PTM uses the
concept of a “time window” to represent this temporal proximity: ratings are partitioned
into several elemental time windows, the length of which could either be fixed (e.g. two
days) or variable based on how frequently a seller is rated. If the ratings are submitted
during the same time window, the weight z for that rating pair will be 1; otherwise, it will
be calculated as follows:
z = λTa−Tb (2.1)
where Ta and Tb are integer values identifying two time windows, and Tb corresponds
to the more recent of these two time windows.1
The overall evaluation of the shared experiences of buyer b with advisor a is known
as a’s “private” reputation, and is estimated as the probability that a will provide fair
ratings to b. However, given that the buyer only has incomplete information about an
advisor, the best estimation of this probability is through calculating its expected value.
As noted in Section 1.1, the beta probability distribution function is frequently used to
represent probability distributions of binary events. Thus the private reputation of advisor
a is calculated as shown in Equation 2.2:




In Equation 2.2, Np represents the sum of the weights (as calculated using Equation
2.1) of all positive rating pairs for all sellers commonly rated by b and a, and Nall is the
1Tb will be the smaller of the two values, such that 1 indicates the most recent time window, 2 the
second-most recent time window, and so on.
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total sum of weights of all rating pairs involving b and a. If λ = 0, then Np and Nall will
be simply the counts of the applicable types of rating pairs. Note also that Pr(a) is the
probability that advisor a will provide fair ratings to the buyer b; an advisor’s rating is
considered to be “fair” if it is the same as the buyer’s rating. Thus E(Pr(a)) represents
the probability expectation value of the beta distribution defined by α and β; that is, it is
the most likely probability value that a will be honest in the future [14].
Next, the public reputation of an advisor, which (in a similar fashion to the determi-
nation of private reputation) is estimated as the probability that an advisor will provide
“consistent” ratings, is calculated using Equation 2.3:
α′ = Nc + 1, β




Here, Nc represents the number of ratings, provided by an advisor a, that are consistent
with the majority of ratings provided for that seller by all other buyers up to the moment
that this additional rating is submitted, while N ′all is the total number of ratings provided
by a.
At this point, given some maximum acceptable level of error ε ∈ (0, 1) and level of
confidence γ ∈ (0, 1), w, the reliability of the private reputation value, is derived – which
is then used in the calculation of the overall trustworthiness of a (as in Equations 2.4, 2.5,
and 2.6). As can be seen from Equation 2.6, a more reliable private reputation will have a












if Nall < Nmin
1 otherwise
(2.5)
Tr(a) = wRpri(a) + (1− w)Rpub(a) (2.6)
Once the trustworthiness value has been calculated for each advisor, advisors may be
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then classified as “trustworthy” or “untrustworthy”. If the advisor’s trustworthiness is 0.5
or above, it will be considered trustworthy; otherwise it will be considered untrustworthy.
A similar approach can next be taken for the trustworthiness of a given seller s, once
again making use of the beta family of probability density functions to estimate appropriate
probabilities. First the buyer b calculates her private reputation of s, an estimation of
the probability that s will provide good service, based on b’s past experiences with s.
This makes use of the number of positive ratings, N bpos,i, and negative ratings, N
b
neg,i, she














Next the public reputation of the seller is derived, based on an estimation of the prob-
ability that the seller will provide good service given the trustworthy advisors’ past expe-
riences with s, taking into account b’s own model of trustworthiness of each advisor aj.
First, the ratings are discounted based on the trustworthiness of the applicable advisor.






















































if N ball < Nmin
1 otherwise
(2.11)
Tr(s) = w′Rpri(s) + (1− w′)Rpub(s) (2.12)
Note that Nmin, the minimum number of ratings needed for the buyer b to be confident
about the private reputation value it has of the seller s, is calculated according to Equation
2.4, but is not necessarily the same value used in Equation 2.5.
For greater clarity, we reproduce an edited version of the pseudo-code summary of the
PTM’s algorithm for modelling seller trustworthiness from [42] as Algorithm 1.
The model also includes an incentive mechanism, whereby honest advisors are rewarded
by better offers from sellers, and in turn these sellers receive better reputations and ul-
timately more customers. While interesting in its own right, this mechanism does not
directly affect our current work, and therefore we do not discuss this part of Zhang’s
model further.
We will provide an example scenario showing how the PTM is used in the context of
our proposals, and their effects on the trust modelling in that scenario, in Section 3.2.1.
11
Algorithm 1 PTM Method for Buyer b’s Trustworthiness Model of a Seller s (From [42])
1: {Buyer estimates private reputation of seller based on buyer’s own ratings}
2: Set N bpos = N
b
neg = 0: amount of discounted positive/negative ratings of b;
3: {T1, T2, . . . , Tn}: time windows;
4: for all Ti in {T1, T2, . . . , Tn} do
5: Set N bpos,i = N
b
neg,i = 0: number of bs positive/negative ratings in Ti;
6: Rb,s: buyer bś ratings for seller s;
7: for all rb,s in Rb,s and occuring during Ti do
8: if rb,s = 1 then





















16: Private reputation is then calculated using Equation 2.7;
17: Calculate weight w′ using Equations 2.4 and 2.11;
18: Set public reputation = 0;
19: if w′ < 1 then
20: {private knowledge is limited, buyer estimates public reputation of s} {based on
advisors’ ratings for the seller}
21: {a1, a2, . . . , ak}: trustworthy advisors that have provided ratings for seller s;
22: Set Napos = 0: amount of all discounted positive ratings of advisors;
23: Set Naneg = 0: amount of all discounted negative ratings of advisors;
24: for all aj in {a1, a2, . . . , ak} do
25: Set N
aj
pos = 0: amount of discounted positive ratings of aj;
26: Set N
aj
neg = 0: amount of discounted negative ratings of aj;





neg,i: number of aj’s positive/negative ratings in Ti; {similar to





pos,i based on N
aj
pos,i using Equation 2.8;
30: Set D
aj
neg,i based on N
aj



























35: Public reputation is then calculated using Equation 2.10;
36: end if
37: Trustworthiness is then calculated using Equation 2.12
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2.1.2 Other Trust Models
We also examine how our modifications will improve other trust models, mainly focusing on
TRAVOS [32]. TRAVOS has some similarities to PTM, as in [44] – both take a probabilistic
approach to the modelling of trust, using beta probability density functions (pdfs) – making
it a good comparison to the results we will obtain for PTM.
The TRAVOS model was developed to (a) provide a trust metric, representing the
level of trust in an agent, to be used to conclude whether a given agent is more or less
trustworthy than another; (b) reflect an individual’s confidence in the level of trust it holds
in another agent, in order to gauge the degree of influence which the aforementioned metric
has on the decision to interact with another agent (or not); (c) ensure that an agent cannot
assume that the opinions of others are necessarily accurate or based on real experiences.
Similar to the PTM, under the TRAVOS approach, it is assumed that a truster agent,
atr, will not generally have complete information about a trustee agent, ate, in order to
definitively state the probability, Batr,ate , that ate will fulfill its obligations to atr. At
most, we can calculate an expected value of this probability based on the set of interaction
outcomes of the past interactions between the agents up to some time t, O1:tatr,ate . In other
words, the level of trust τatr,ate is defined as:
τatr,ate = E[Batr,ate|O1:tatr,ate ] (2.13)
Determining this expected value requires a beta pdf to determine the relative probability
that Batr,ate will take a certain value. The shape of the plotted pdf is normally given in
terms of two parameters α and β, which leads to the following formulae:
α = m1:tatr,ate + 1 (2.14)
β = n1:tatr,ate + 1 (2.15)
where t is the time of evaluation, m1:tatr,ate is the number of successful interactions for atr
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with ate up to time t, and likewise n
1:t
atr,ate is the number of unsuccessful interactions under
the same scenario. This leads to the determination of the level of trust τatr,ate as:




Suppose, for example, that a buyer agent b0 is attempting to determine how much it
should trust some target seller agent s0 given that, as of time t, b0 has had four satisfactory
purchases and three unsatisfactory purchases from s0. Under the TRAVOS model, this
trust value would be computed as follows:
α = m1:tb0,s0 + 1 = 4 + 1 = 5











A separate metric is then determined such that atr may measure its confidence in this
trust value, τatr,ate , after choosing an acceptable margin of error ε. This metric, γatr,ate ,
represents the posterior probability that the true value of Batr,ate lies within the range
[τatr,ate − ε, τatr,ate + ε], and is calculated as a function of α, β, ε, and τatr,ate .
If the confidence is not sufficiently high, the advice of third parties may be considered
as well. This would be performed by asking other agents to report the number of success-
ful and unsuccessful interactions that each has had with ate, the aggregate of which are
computed as Matr,ate and Natr,ate respectively. This in turn leads to a separate probability
distribution, Dc, with α = Matr,ate + 1 and β = Natr,ate + 1, which can then be used in
Equation 2.16.
However, mindful of the possibility that some other agents may report untruthfully,
TRAVOS also incorporates a mechanism to filter out the reports by agents which have
low reputations. The first stage is to estimate the probability that an agent aop’s reported
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opinion about the trustee ate, denoted R̂aop,ate , is accurate. This is performed by (i)
constructing additional beta distributions, Dr derived from R̂aop,ate , and Do which is based
on the outcomes of the previous interactions for which aop provided to atr an opinion similar
to R̂aop,ate about ate or some other trustee, and (ii) finding their respective expected values,
Er and Eo. The range of possible values for both Er and Eo, i.e. [0, 1], is then divided into
several disjoint intervals (bins) of equal size2 to determine (in essence) whether Er and Eo
are located in the same bin, via the calculation of an accuracy value denoted as ρatr,aop .
Finally, TRAVOS attempts to reduce the effect of unreliable opinions on Dc through
an approach that discounts high values of parameters, unless the probability of a rater’s
opinion being accurate is very high. This is performed through the construction of another
beta distribution, D̄, based on (i) the accuracy value ρatr,aop , and (ii) the expected values
and standard deviations of the uniform distribution (α = β = 1) and of the distribution(s)
of the unreliable opinion(s) that are sought to be removed, Dr.
We can identify three important distinctions between PTM and TRAVOS:
• PTM uses both private and public knowledge regarding all sellers, whereas TRAVOS
uses only the private knowledge regarding some selected sellers.
• The method used by TRAVOS to aggregate ratings provided by certain advisors is
more complex, reducing the effect of ratings from less trustworthy advisors using a
method of filtering.
• TRAVOS reasons about the specific seller being considered when determining how
much to trust an advisor. By contrast, in PTM, advisor reputation is calculated
independently of any specific seller.
We will return to these distinctions in Section 3.3.2 in considering the differences in
results between the two models when applying our approach.
2Teacy et al. specified that five intervals should be used. However, in our simulations in Section 3.3.2
and thereafter, we followed the selection in [42] of two bins as providing the best results.
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2.2 Techniques for Limiting Network Size
In examining potential techniques for finding the most appropriate size of an advisor net-
work in the aforementioned trust models, we drew some inspiration from techniques in
other areas of artificial intelligence, more specifically from collaborative filtering. Before
outlining these specific techniques, we first briefly explain the relevant background in this
area.
A recommender system is a system which generates recommendations for its users based
on prior inputs from its user base, often in the form of subjective opinions, about the items
in question [27][26]. For example, a film recommender system might accept inputs from
users about whether a particular film was good or bad, and then uses that information to
recommend the best or most relevant selection to users who hadn’t previously seen that
film.
One of the earliest, if not the first, recommender system described in the literature was
the Tapestry system [5], which suggested a means of recommending the most interesting e-
mail messages to users, regardless of its source, based on (for example) whether the sender
or a replier of a message was indicated on a pre-specified list. That work also introduced
the term collaborative filtering (abbreviated CF), which refers to a subset of recommender
systems in which users collaborate – or their information is used in a collaborative fashion
– in order to generate recommendations. GroupLens [26] was a later CF mechanism that
used a more implicit filtering mechanism, recommending newsgroup articles to a user if
they were rated highly by other users similar to the first user, based on a comparison of
the users’ past ratings.
The research group that first proposed GroupLens discussed some of the design choices
for collaborative filtering algorithms in [9]. It is from this work that we find two possible
methods for limiting the number of advisors.
The first method, correlation thresholding [30], sets a minimum correlation weight that
an advisor must have in order to be considered part of the user’s “neighbourhood”. How-
ever, if the threshold is set too high, then the neighbourhood may be very small, limiting
the possibilities for predictions.
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The second method discussed, best-n-neighbors, which is cited as being used in the
GroupLens [26] system among others,3 picks a maximum number of neighbours to use,
max nbors. (The same process is also referred to in the literature as k-nearest neighbours,
or kNN [18].) The neighbours chosen would be those with the highest correlation to the
instant user.
In Chapter 3, we introduce these two methods into our proposed framework. In Section
5.2, we return to contrast our treatment of these techniques, in comparison with the efforts
described in [9].
2.3 Referral Systems
A potential supplement to finding a more appropriate size for the advisor network is derived
from Yu and Singh [39][40]. In [39] they discussed, as an idea for future work, reputation
management in a social network making use of a referral mechanism. In this mechanism,
a requesting agent (roughly equivalent to the buyer in our e-commerce scenario) would
consult its “neighbour” agents, each of which might either provide advice on the question
itself, provide references to other appropriate advisors, or both, depending on the question.
As a result, a requesting agent would be able to benefit from the information held by the
pool of agents without having a large number of neighbours [42].
A version of this mechanism is implemented in [40]: Each agent has a set of acquain-
tances, which were randomly determined at the outset, and did not change thereafter. For
each of those acquaintances, each agent maintains a model of the acquaintance’s expertise
(trustworthiness) and sociability (i.e., whether that acquaintance would itself be likely to
refer to other trustworthy agents). A subset of the acquaintances representing the most
trustworthy and sociable agents would be designated as neighbours, the composition of
which might change from time to time. Each agent would also be assigned a “branching
factor” specifying how many referrals from its set of neighbours it could provide at any
one time.
3Notwithstanding this citation in [9], we were unable to find any further details about the use of this
technique, or how it was applied, in our review of [26] and other papers from the GroupLens research
group.
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A requesting agent, Ar, might then desire to evaluate the trustworthiness of some target
agent Ag. If Ag was already among Ar’s acquaintances, it would use its existing local trust
model for Ag for its evaluation. Otherwise it would query its acquaintances for information
about some Ag. If an acquaintance were also acquainted with a target agent, it would
be accepted as a “witness”; else it would provide referrals to a subset of its neighbours
(limited to the value of the branching factor). The requesting agent would then query these
referred agents in turn, and so on until either a maximum depth of the trust network was
reached or the desired number of witness agents had been found. Each witness would then
provide some belief function computed using Dempster-Shafer theory, based on its local
ratings of prior interactions with the target agent, indicating its trustworthiness of that
agent. Additional steps would then be taken to determine whether each of those witnesses
were themselves trustworthy or untrustworthy, and ultimately the belief functions from the
remaining witnesses would be combined to compute the reputation of the target agent.
Yolum and Singh [37][38] expanded on the earlier work, in part by introducing the
concept of self-organizing referral networks – that is, a referral network acting without
external control, and adapting to take into account useful entities. Interestingly this work
also discusses a “capability” metric that might be used to measure whether an agent would
be likely to give a good answer for a given query, or alternatively whether an answer that










where Q = 〈q1 . . . qn〉 is a query vector derived from the requesting agent’s interest
vector (representing the agent’s interest in receiving different services), E = 〈e1 . . . en〉 is
an expertise vector (which specifies the trustworthiness of the queried agent with respect
to each of these services); and n is the number of dimensions that these vectors have.
This work also examines different referral policies that an agent might use – either
referring all neighbours, referring all “matching” neighbours (those scoring above a given
capability threshold), or referring only the best neighbour (that is, the one with the highest
capability threshold).
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A quite exhaustive examination of various design choices in referral systems is also
contained in [38], some of the more interesting results being as follows:
• Requiring a high number of referrals will not guarantee a high-quality referral net-
work; in some cases fewer referrals may be desired, such as for low capability thresh-
olds.
• If agents value high sociability (as defined earlier in this section), then agents with
similar interests are more likely to become neighbours; in some (but not all cases) this
might improve the likelihood that suitable service providers (sellers) will be found.
• On the other hand, if agents place a higher priority on a high quality of service, then
more strong authorities – that is, agents that are highly reliable, as in [25] – will
emerge.
We finally note that the referral techniques discussed above have some similarity to
the Repage system presented in [28] – a system that is more directly related to trust
modelling. Similar to certain of the referral systems discussed above [40], Repage combines
the requesting agent’s own evaluation, or image, of the target agent with the reputation
of that agent, i.e. the requesting agent’s belief about the consensus evaluation regarding
the target. The latter component is derived in large part from third-party agents, known
as informers, which can transmit their own reported images of the target; units known
as detectors are then responsible for determining which information will be most useful in
evaluating the reputation of the target. Thus, the set of informers need not be static, much
as the referral mechanism we will introduce in Chapter 4 will seek to find the advisors that
are most experienced with a given target agent.
Based on this earlier work, it stands to reason that a similar advisor referral method
could be used in combination with the limiting techniques discussed in the previous section
in order to yield an overall smaller advisor network size. However, we will also explore
the effects of our more principled approach to applying network limiting techniques –
specifically, varying the size of the advisor network – alongside advisor referrals, whereas
the size of the network and other parameters were kept constant in some of the earlier
works, specifically [40][38].
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We will introduce our proposal for integrating advisor referrals in Chapter 4. We then
return to contrast our approach to those of other authors in Section 5.3.
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Chapter 3
Limiting Advisor Network Size
3.1 Proposed Techniques
In the previous chapter we noted some past work examining the usefulness of setting a max-
imum number of advisors or correlation thresholding in collaborative filtering recommender
systems [9]. We now wish to examine whether either method will lead to improvements
in the accuracy of trust modelling. We hypothesize that both of these methods should be
effective in that, although they will remove some information from the model, this infor-
mation will originate from advisors that are themselves modelled as being less trustworthy
than those that remain. As a result, we should be able to have greater confidence in the
results computed with these methods, since they will be generated using information from
the more trustworthy advisors, and not the others.
We note that the results from [9] (which we discuss in greater detail in Section 5.4)
indicate that setting a maximum size to the advisor network performs better than thresh-
olding in the collaborative filtering scenario, which in turn might suggest that it is likely
to be the most effective approach for trust modelling as well. However, we cannot over-
look the distinction between correlation for collaborative filtering and reputation. While
similarity with a buyer may indirectly impact on that buyer’s private reputation of an
advisor, the private reputation of a seller only relates to the buyer’s ratings for that seller,
ignoring similarity, while similarity is not a factor at all in public reputation. Hence we
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propose that both options, trustworthiness thresholding and maximum number of advisors,
should be thoroughly examined. (We will return to the challenge of balancing similarity
and reputation modelling in Section 5.4.)
That said, neither setting a maximum number of advisors nor using thresholding can
be directly applied to the PTM’s computation of advisor reputation. For example, the
public reputation component of an advisor’s reputation relies on the comparison of its
interactions with those of other advisors. If we had some a priori information about
these other advisors that could be used when computing the public reputation for a single
advisor, then max nbors or thresholding might be useful in this computation. However,
in PTM, this is not the case: the advisor trustworthiness values must be calculated for all
possible advisors, using all of the available information, before the buyer can proceed to
calculate seller reputation.
Our application of these techniques in the seller reputation model is formalized as
follows.
3.1.1 Trustworthiness Thresholding
We first choose some threshold L (0 ≤ L ≤ 1) which represents the minimum advisor
trustworthiness value Tr(a) required for an agent to be included in the advisor network.
We then define the set AL,b = {a1, a2, . . . , ak} consisting of all advisors for which Tr(a) ≥ L
for a particular buyer b. We then use the subset AL,b,s, consisting of the advisors in AL,b that
have provided ratings for the seller s, in place of the previously-defined set {a1, . . . , ak}, the
set of all advisors that have provided ratings for s, in the PTM seller reputation algorithm
(reproduced in Section 2.1.1 as Algorithm 1).
3.1.2 Maximum Number of Advisors
For a particular buyer b, after having calculated the personalized trustworthiness of each
advisor for b as per the first part of the PTM, we sort the list of all n advisors from great-
est trustworthiness value to least, in the set {a1, a2, . . . , an}. We choose some maximum
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number of advisors for each buyer, max nbors ≤ n, and then truncate this set to the set
Ab = {a1, a2, . . . , amax nbors}. We thus obtain the set of max nbors advisors that have been
calculated to be the most trustworthy for b. Again, the subset of Ab that has provided
ratings for the seller s is used in place of the larger set {a1, . . . , ak} in the PTM seller
reputation algorithm.
3.2 Examples
3.2.1 Using the PTM
As in [42], we consider the case where a buyer b wishes to assess the trustworthiness of a
particular seller s0 with whom the buyer has had little or no experience. For the purposes
of this simplified example, we assume that there are four available advisors from which b
may seek advice, namely aw, ax, ay, and az.
We assume initially that, among sellers that b has had past dealings with, each of these
advisors has provided ratings only for the five sellers (s1, s2, s3, s4, s5), and has rated each of
the sellers at most once in each time window in the sequence T , where T1 is the most recent
time window. The ratings may be either positive (1) or negative (0); a dash (-) indicates
that no rating was provided during the indicated time window. The ratings provided by
each advisor for these sellers are listed in Table 3.1. The buyer b has also provided some
ratings for the sellers, as indicated in the same table; note here that b does not provide
ratings for every seller each time window.
We derive the trustworthiness values for each advisor using Equations 2.2 through 2.6.
For simplicity, in these calculations, we follow the method used in the examples provided
in [42]. First, we will only consider pairs of ratings provided during the same time window.
We thus assume that the forgetting factor as defined previously is λ = 0. Hence Equation
2.1 will yield z = 1 for all pairs of ratings occurring within the same time window, and
z = 0 otherwise. For the determination of Nc, we assume for simplicity that any rating
of 1 provided by the advisor is a “consistent” rating, meaning a rating that matches the
majority opinion of other advisors for a particular seller that received a rating. Finally, in
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Table 3.1: Ratings of Sellers Provided by Advisors and Buyer b
aw ax ay
T T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
s1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
s2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
s3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
s4 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
s5 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
az b
T T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
s1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
s2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 -
s3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 - -
s4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 - - -
s5 0 0 0 0 0 1 - - - -
Equation 2.4 we use γ = 0.8 and ε = 0.15, leading to Nmin = 51. The pertinent values are
shown in Table 3.2.
We proceed to the calculation of the trustworthiness of a seller s0. As a preliminary




. Of our four advisors, only aw, ax and az have provided ratings for
the seller s0, as indicated in Table 3.3a. The subsequent Table 3.3b indicates how these
ratings translate into positive and negative amounts, while Table 3.3c shows how these
ratings are discounted based on the advisor trustworthiness values calculated earlier.
Using Equation 2.10, we may then find the public reputation of s0. In keeping with
the examples provided in [42], we remove our previously-stated simplification that only
compared ratings in the same time window, and thus set a forgetting factor of λ = 0.9:
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Table 3.2: Trustworthiness of Advisors aw, ax, ay, and az for Buyer b
aj Np Nall α β Rpri Nc N
′
all α
′ β′ Rpub w Tr(a)
aw 5 15 6 11 0.353 14 25 15 12 0.556 0.294 0.497
ax 15 15 16 1 0.941 25 25 26 1 0.963 0.294 0.957
ay 8 15 19 8 0.529 11 25 12 15 0.444 0.294 0.469
az 0 15 1 16 0.059 0 25 1 26 0.037 0.294 0.0434
Table 3.3: Ratings of s0 Provided by aw, ax, az
(a) Ratings
Ti T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
aw 1 0 1 0 1
ax 0 0 0 1 1
az 1 1 1 1 1
(b) Amounts of Ratings
Ti T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
Nawpos,i 1 0 1 0 1
Nawneg,i 0 1 0 1 0
Naxpos,i 0 0 0 1 1
Naxneg,i 1 1 1 0 0
Nazpos,i 1 1 1 1 1
Nazneg,i 0 0 0 0 0
(c) Discounted Amounts of Ratings
Ti T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
Dawpos,i 0.397 0 0.397 0 0.397
Dawneg,i 0 0.397 0 0.397 0
Daxpos,i 0 0 0 0.937 0.937
Daxneg,i 0.937 0.937 0.937 0 0
Dazpos,i 0.0294 0.0294 0.0294 0.0294 0.0294
Dazneg,i 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 3.4: Advisor Network Size with a Correlation Threshold
L 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
AL,b {aw, ax, ay, az} {aw, ax, ay} {aw, ax, ay} {ax} {ax} {}




0.937 ∗ 0.9i−1 + 0.397 ∗ (0.90 + 0.92 + 0.94) +
5∑
i=1
0.0294 ∗ 0.9i−1 + 1
5∑
i=1






0.0294 ∗ 0.9i−1 + 2
= 0.4480
Finally, since the buyer has not dealt with s0 before, the weight for the private reputa-
tion w′ is zero, meaning we can immediately conclude that Tr(s0) = 0.4480.
3.2.2 Reputation Thresholding
We now turn to exploring the effects of the modifications proposed in Section 3.1. We first
examine how setting a minimum reputation threshold would affect the size of our network
and, in turn, the computation of the private reputation component of seller trustworthiness.
We choose several potential values for the threshold L and indicate, based on the results
in the previous section regarding advisor trustworthiness, how many advisors would be
included in the buyer b’s advisor network in this case. The results are shown in Table 3.4.
Trivially, when L = 0, all advisors will be included in the network, and Tr(s0) = 0.4480
– the same value as calculated at the end of the previous subsection. For L = 0.2 and
L = 0.4, the advisor network consists of aw, ax, and ay, of which only aw and ax contribute
ratings for s0. We refer to the resulting trustworthiness value as Trw,x(s0), which we
calculate using Equation 2.10 to be 0.439.
For L = 0.6 and L = 0.8, the advisor network consists solely of ax, and therefore the
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Table 3.5: Trustworthiness of s0 Using a Maximum Number of Advisors
max nbors 0 1 2 3 ≥ 4
Ab {} {ax} {aw, ax} {aw, ax, ay} {aw, ax, ay, az}
min(Tr(a)) undefined 0.957 0.497 0.469 0.0434
Tr(s0) 0.5 0.697 0.439 0.439 0.4480
seller trustworthiness Trx(s0) (again by Equation 2.10) would be 0.697. Finally, for L = 1,




3.2.3 Maximum Number of Advisors
We might elect to use a maximum number of advisors in place of the thresholding procedure
examined in the previous subsection, so we now look at how the determination of seller
trustworthiness would be affected in this case. Depending on the max nbors value chosen,
we would have the results shown in table 3.5, with the advisor network representing the
max nbors advisors most trusted by the buyer b. For comparison, we indicate the minimum
trustworthiness value of the advisors in the network, to show the maximum threshold L
that could be used to get the same result using thresholding.
3.3 Experimental Results
To verify that these modifications provide an improvement over the original PTM, we now
turn to evaluating the performance of each of these changes. Some of this evaluation is
inspired by the methods used in [43] to show the effectiveness of the original model.
We pause briefly to note some background details about the experimental setup for
the simulations in this thesis. The necessary software written to simulate the scenarios
documented in this thesis was written in Java using standard Java libraries. Much of the
code was reused from the similar experiments conducted by Zhang and documented in [42],
with appropriate changes in order to apply the techniques described earlier in this chapter,
27
as well as the referral approach that will be described in Chapter 4. The simulations were
primarily run, in sequence, on a dual-core workstation computer.
However, for scenarios involving large populations (which required significantly more
memory and computation time), the corresponding simulations were run in parallel on
additional research servers using single-core processors. These large-population scenarios
also generally required a significant amount of memory in order to allow the buyer to model
the trust of every other advisor agent; this required adjustments to the standard size of the
Java Virtual Machine’s heap, using up to 1 GB of random access memory per simulation.
Overall we estimate that approximately 250–350 hours of processing time were required
to complete the experiments documented in this thesis.
3.3.1 Validating Effectiveness
We first verify that each of our modifications to PTM maintains the effectiveness of the
trust model – that is, the new models still accurately reflect the trustworthiness of agents
in the system. We first reiterate that these modifications do not in any way affect how indi-
vidual buyer agents model the trustworthiness of their potential advisors. As noted at the
beginning of this chapter, the max nbors and thresholding approaches are not appropriate
to use as part of the PTM’s method for modelling advisor trustworthiness, but only as a
means of selecting advisors once this model has been constructed. Thus any application of
either approach will only affect which advisors are used once the advisor reputations have
already been determined, and in turn the computations of the trustworthiness of sellers,
but will not retroactively affect advisor trustworthiness.
Hence, to show that the modified trust model remains effective in modelling seller
trustworthiness, we do not need to concern ourselves with the computation of advisor
trustworthiness, but instead confirm, as in [43], that in the modified models, a decrease in
the honesty of a seller corresponds to a decrease in the trustworthiness value calculated for
that seller – for example, we expect that a seller that is dishonest 20% of the time should
be modelled as being more trustworthy as one that is dishonest 40% of the time, and
both should be modelled as having higher reputations as a seller that lies 60% of the time.
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Note that at this stage we are not overly concerned with the accuracy of the calculated
reputation values, so long as the computed trustworthiness is at least roughly proportional
to the actual honesty of the seller.
This property was shown in [43] by simulating an environment consisting of one buyer,
80 advisors, and 100 sellers, where the sellers are evenly divided into ten groups, each
having a probability of dishonesty between zero and 0.9. The buyer and the advisors
each randomly select 80 of the sellers and rate each of those sellers. Finally, given these
ratings, the buyer calculates the trustworthiness values corresponding to each of the sellers
using Algorithm 1 (see Section 2.1.1). These tests are performed for two values of the
percentage of lying (dishonest) advisors, specifically 30% and 60%, and repeated a total
of ten times for each possible combination. The results indicated that PTM (combining
public and private reputation) does reflect, relatively accurately, the actual trust of each
seller in these scenarios.
We repeat these conditions for our simulation, using a derivative of the modelling
and simulation software originally written by Zhang for [42] and related work, and now
apply our techniques for limiting the size of the network. The results of these simulations
under various combinations of these modifications are shown in Figure 3.1 for simulations
where 30% of advisors are lying, and Figure 3.2 for scenarios where the percentage of
lying advisors is 60%. In each of these graphs, the x-axis represents the predetermined
probability of dishonesty for each category of sellers. The y-axis represents the average
(mean) of the trust values, calculated using Algorithm 1 (as modified as discussed in Section
3.1.1 or 3.1.2, as applicable), averaged over all repetitions and all of the ten sellers in each
category.
We stated in Chapter 1 that we consider trust to be an agent’s belief that some other
agent will carry out the tasks it says it will perform. We consider that an ideal trust model
under this definition would represent trust as the proportion of interactions in which an
agent does carry out the promised tasks. For example, a seller that is modelled as likely to
not deliver the sold goods for four out of every ten transactions would ideally be assigned
a trust value of 1− 0.4 = 0.6. In Figures 3.1 and 3.2, this model is represented graphically
by a slope of -1 starting at (0, 1). Ultimately, we seek one or more variants that produce
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trust values very close to these “ideal” values.
We see that, in general, using thresholding and max nbors does yield a trust model
that tracks well with the ideal trust values, for both the 30% and 60% lying advisors (LA)
cases. However, the error – the difference between the actual trust values and the ideal
figures – varies depending on the parameters used, particularly the specific value of the
threshold or max nbors.
Figure 3.1a compares the performance of an unrestricted advisor network against several
possible max nbors parameters, for the case where 30% of the advisors are dishonest. All of
the variants using max nbors provided better results compared to not using any network-
limiting method at all; that is, the plotted results all came closer to the “ideal” slope
than for the unrestricted network. However, as expected, the best results came not from
choosing extreme parameters (i.e. a very high or very low value for max nbors), but rather
from somewhere in the middle: the results that best matched the ideal trust model came
for max nbors = 40 (that is, the top 50% of the 80 advisors in the network). However,
performance did not suffer significantly for smaller values, up to max nbors = 15 (i.e. the
top 19%).
A similar comparison for different threshold values is shown in Figure 3.1b. Here
the results differed slightly: using a threshold between 0.5 and 0.7 improved the results
compared to a network that had not been thresholded, with a threshold of 0.55 showing the
greatest improvement. However, for thresholds of 0.8 and 0.9, the accuracy was reduced
dramatically, as shown by their near-horizontal and horizontal graphs, respectively, on
this figure. This is because very few (if any) advisors, apart from the buyer itself, would
have a trust value above such a high threshold. The 0.9 threshold graph demonstrates
the worst case where no suitable advisors could be found. In this case, in computing the
public trustworthiness of sellers using Equation 2.10, the sum components will be zero,
therefore the PTM would default to assigning each seller a trustworthiness of 0+1
0+2
= 0.5.
The implication is that a threshold of 0.9 is simply an unrealistically high value to use to
limit the advisor network in PTM.
Figures 3.2a and 3.2b cover a separate but very similar set of simulations covering the
60% lying advisors case. As can be seen by looking at the “No MaxNbors / No Threshold”
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(a) Comparison of max nbors approaches (30% LA)
(b) Comparison of thresholding approaches (30% LA)
Figure 3.1: Verification testing for the modifications using 30% lying advisors.
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(a) Comparison of max nbors approaches (60% LA)
(b) Comparison of thresholding approaches (60% LA)
Figure 3.2: Verification testing for the modifications using 60% lying advisors.
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graphs, which are very far from the ideal-case graph shown in both figures, not applying
max nbors or thresholding at all will result in poor accuracy for the trust model. However,
the accuracy can be significantly improved by applying either max nbors or thresholding,
with our experiments indicating 0.55 as the best threshold value, and max nbors = 30 as
the best among the tested max nbors options.
A summary of the simulation results for both 30% and 60% lying advisors is provided
in Figure 3.3. In these figures we also provide results for a similar set of simulations when
the fraction of lying advisors is increased to 90%. This perspective may indeed provide
a more intuitive comparison of the results compared to those in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. In
both cases, each graph represents one of the tested percentages of lying advisors (either
30%, 60%, or 90%). The x-axis indicates the parameter chosen, if any, for max nbors
(in Figure 3.3a) or the trustworthiness threshold (in Figure 3.3b). The y-axis shows the
mean absolute error (MAE) associated with that particular simulation – in other words,
the average absolute difference between the “ideal” trust model as discussed above (error
= 0), and the actual results for the variant measured. If the predicted trust values are very
close to the actual values, the MAE will be low; if these values are far apart, the MAE will
be high. The case where no max nbors value is used – that is, all 80 advisors are included
regardless – is represented by the far right of the graphs in Figure 3.3a. In Figure 3.3b,
the equivalent case where no thresholding is applied is represented by a threshold of zero,
at the far left of the graph.
We point out that an MAE of 0.25 – such as seen for a threshold of 0.9 in Figure 3.3b –
represents a special value in these graphs, representing the largest MAE that should be ex-
pected in our simulations if the model is accurately classifying sellers as either trustworthy
or untrustworthy. We noted above that in the “worst case” thresholding scenario where
no suitable advisors can be found, the trust model will assign each seller a default value of
0.5. Taking account of all 100 sellers, each having been assigned a percentage of dishonest
behaviour between 0 (which would correspond to 100% trustworthiness) and 90% (which
would indicate 10% trustworthiness), the MAE in this case would be computed as follows:
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(a) Error produced in max nbors approaches
(b) Error produced in thresholding approaches
Figure 3.3: Mean average error of various trust model variants
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10abs(1− 0.5) + 10abs(0.9− 0.5) + 10abs(0.8− 0.5) + · · ·+ 10abs(0.1− 0.5)
100
= 0.25
It is possible to have an MAE above 0.25, as seen in (for example) certain of the 90%
lying advisor cases; this would only occur if for some reason the system is modelling some
of the sellers as trustworthy when they are in fact untrustworthy, and vice versa.
From Figure 3.3a, we can also see the max nbors approach may be affected by the
percentage of lying advisors. Specifically, setting max nbors = 40 when 60% of the advisors
are dishonest yields significantly worse performance than when 30% of the advisors are
lying. On the other hand, using max nbors = 30 yields similar performance results when
either 30% or 60% of advisors are lying. If 90% of advisors are lying, however, max nbors =
30 yields poor accuracy, whereas the best performance is found by setting max nbors = 10.
This result suggests that when more advisors are lying, it is better to set a smaller value
for max nbors. However, from Figure 3.3b we see that the thresholding approach is not
heavily affected by the percentage of lying advisors. Even though there is a significant
reduction in accuracy when moving from 60% to 90% lying advisors, the general shape of
the graph (and therefore the best choices for the threshold) are largely unchanged. This is
somewhat expected since thresholding allows only the trustworthy advisors to be included
in buyers’ networks.
Note that to simplify the presentation of our remaining results, we will use “summary”
graphs similar to those in Figures 3.3a and 3.3b throughout the remainder of this chapter,
and again in parts of Chapter 4. We believe it should be clear from our initial results
(Figures 3.1 and 3.2) that the MAE is sufficient to determine how well the computed trust
values track with the expected values.
We noted in Section 3.2.1, that there is a relationship between max nbors and threshold
parameters, in that there will be values for both methods that will yield the same network
composition. We will investigate this relationship further in Appendix A.
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3.3.2 Applicability to Alternative Model
Having shown that our optimizations1 have proven useful to PTM, we now turn to demon-
strating that these changes are also effective for other trust models. Specifically we look
to show that the TRAVOS model [32] can be improved by applying our modifications.
We discussed TRAVOS in detail in Section 2.1.2 of this thesis. We will nevertheless
take this opportunity to reiterate the relationship between the two models. TRAVOS has
some similarities to PTM, as in [44] – both take a probabilistic approach to the modelling
of trust, using beta probability density functions (pdfs) – making it a good comparison to
the results above.
However, there are three important distinctions between the models: One, PTM uses
both private and public knowledge regarding all sellers, whereas TRAVOS uses only the
private knowledge about certain selected sellers. Two, the method used by TRAVOS to
aggregate ratings provided by certain advisors is more complex, which serves to reduce the
effect of ratings from less trustworthy advisors.
Third, the TRAVOS model of the trustworthiness of a particular advisor is specific to
the seller being considered. This means that the buyer (and each advisor) should construct
a separate advisor network for each seller in the system. As we will discuss in Section 6.2.4,
this may have certain negative impacts on the memory usage of such a system.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our optimizations, we perform similar sets of ex-
periments to those performed in Section 3.3.1; again, we used a modified version of the
simulation and modelling software developed for the earlier work by Zhang. These simu-
lations for the max nbors and thresholding optimizations use an environment consisting
of one buyer, 80 advisors, and 100 sellers with varying probabilities of dishonesty. During
the simulation, the buyer and each advisor both randomly select and rate a total of 80
sellers. Finally, the buyer calculates the trustworthiness values corresponding to each of
the sellers. These tests are performed for two values of the percentage of lying advisors,
30% and 60%. The results of these experiments are shown in Figures 3.4a and 3.4b. Each
1In this thesis we occasionally refer to our proposed techniques as “optimizations”. This is meant to
indicate that we are using these techniques to improve the accuracy of trust modelling. We do not claim
that these results are “optimal” in the sense of no further improvements being possible.
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figure shows two graphs, indicating how each model performs for both of the tested levels
of lying advisors; as with the graphs shown previously, the data points map the applicable
max nbors or threshold parameter on the x-axis to the mean absolute error (MAE) of the
trust model under that scenario on the y-axis.
These figures indicate mixed results with regards to the effect of applying these mod-
ifications to TRAVOS. Consider that an unrestricted network (as represented by the far
right of Figure 3.4a, or the far left of Figure 3.4b) will yield a mean absolute error value
between 0.15 and 0.25. Recalling our discussion of the meaning of an MAE of 0.25 in the
previous section, it should be clear that these MAE values indicate relatively low accuracy.
In comparison, most of the models incorporating either max nbors or a threshold will have
a smaller error value, and thus improved accuracy over an unrestricted network.
However, the progression is not entirely consistent. For example, in examining both
Figures 3.4a and 3.4b, the graphs representing the TRAVOS model have a zig-zag shape,
with the MAE increasing and decreasing at various points in a somewhat haphazard fash-
ion. This is particularly true for the thresholding cases, where the changes in the MAE
seem to be fairly random.
For the max nbors cases (Figure 3.4a), there is less randomness in the MAE, but it
is still surprising that the error decreases between max nbors = 40 and max nbors = 60,
given that error had increased as max nbors was increased from 20 to 40.
The implication of both results is that under certain circumstances, decreasing the
threshold (or increasing the max nbors parameter) serves to add additional advisors into
the network which serve to reduce the trust modelling error – despite the fact that those
agents would have been modelled as “less trustworthy” than those included in the more
restricted network. In other words, some advisors seem to have been modelled as more
trustworthy (or less trustworthy) than they should have been. The most likely apparent
cause of this fault would be with the TRAVOS approach itself, but we cannot say conclu-
sively that this is the case based on these results, and further examination of this theory
is raised for future work in Section 6.2.3.
Nevertheless, the results reinforce the value of our proposed approach, to set an effec-
tive value for max nbors or thresholding, shown here through experimental methods. To
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this end, we are able to say that in general, TRAVOS works best in this scenario when
max nbors is set to 20, or when a threshold of 0.5 is set.
3.3.3 Effects for Larger Populations
Given that most existing e-commerce systems have very large populations of users – on the
order of thousands or even millions – we felt it would also be useful to demonstrate that
our techniques also work with larger populations of advisors. Assuming this to be true,
we would also observe the results and any distinctions from the earlier results involving
smaller advisor populations.
We perform these simulations using PTM for an advisor population size of 500, which we
feel is a useful starting point for considering systems with populations of this magnitude.2
These tests otherwise maintain the same test conditions used for our earlier tests in Section
3.3.1 in terms of the number of sellers and the duration of the simulation. Again, however,
we run the simulations with two values of the percentage of lying advisors (LA) – 30% and
60% – and with several values of max nbors and thresholds.
The results of these simulations, in terms of the mean absolute error of the trust model
under each simulation as plotted against the max nbors or threshold value used, are indi-
cated in Figures 3.5a and 3.5b respectively.
It seems clear in comparing the results from Figure 3.5b to those in Figure 3.3b that the
results of applying different threshold values is reasonably consistent despite the change in
advisor population. More precisely, we mean that for both populations, the MAE is quite
high for thresholds below 0.5 – approximately 0.1 for the 30% LA case, and approximately
0.2 for the 60% LA scenarios – but then decreases sharply, to below 0.03, as the threshold
is increased to 0.5, then remains at a similarly low value as the threshold increased further,
up to a threshold of 0.7. The MAE then climbs sharply again for both populations as
the threshold is increased to 0.8 and then to 0.9. This similarity notwithstanding, we
observe that, when all other parameters are the same, the MAE is still slightly lower for
2We reiterate that this only reflects the total number of users in the system, not the number that will
be used in the advisor network, which we will consider next.
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(a) Varying max nbors
(b) Varying threshold
Figure 3.4: Mean absolute error when applying optimizations to TRAVOS at 30% and
60% LA
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(a) Comparison when varying max nbors
(b) Comparison when varying threshold
Figure 3.5: Mean absolute error applying optimizations to PTM with advisor population
of 500
40
Figure 3.6: Comparison of mean absolute error when varying max nbors (as proportion of
advisor population)
the larger population. We believe this is simply because the larger population means that
more highly-trusted advisors are available, and thus the system can make use of more
information about each of the sellers, regardless of the threshold applied.
On the other hand, comparing the corresponding max nbors tests, as shown in Fig-
ures 3.5a and 3.3a, is somewhat trickier. It is clear that for both of the tested advisor
populations, setting some max nbors value that is somewhat less that half of the advisor
population size will result in a reduction in trust modelling error. However, while a value
of max nbors of 30 is optimal for an advisor population of 80, the optimal value when the
total population is 500 is much larger, at about 200 (which suggests that the value should
not simply be set in absolute terms).
To find the solution to the max nbors issue, we remark that the two figures (3.5a and
3.3a) have some visual similarity. This suggests it may be more appropriate to compare the
two results in terms of max nbors as a proportion of the total advisor population. An effort
to do this is provided as Figure 3.6.3 This figure confirms that when setting max nbors as
a proportion of the total advisor population, the accuracy of the trust model is relatively
consistent from one population size to the next.
3Note that some of the data in this figure was interpolated from the simulations, since comparable
proportions were not used in both sets of experiments.
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(a) Comparison when varying max nbors
(b) Comparison when varying threshold
Figure 3.7: Mean absolute error applying optimizations to TRAVOS with advisor popula-
tion of 500, compared to results for population of 80
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A similar set of simulations were also run to explore the effect of the larger population
with the TRAVOS model. These are shown in Figure 3.7.4 Much like the results for the
smaller population discussed in Section 3.3.2, the changes in the mean absolute error as
the applicable parameter increases or decreases tend to be somewhat haphazard. However,
the graphs for the two populations do not seem to track each other very well, in that there
are no local maxima or minima that are consistent for both sizes of advisor populations.
As discussed above, we are proposing future research on this matter in Section 6.2.3,
which might lead to a more effective method consistent with that shown earlier for PTM.
At the moment however, we must conclude that, although thresholding and max nbors
will allow us to improve the accuracy of trust modelling using TRAVOS with the larger
population, the specific parameter choices will likely change as the population increases.
3.3.4 Using Random Selection for Very Large Populations
Despite having verified the usefulness of our techniques for larger population sizes, partic-
ularly for PTM, in the previous subsection, we also note practical limits on the advisor
population sizes for which these methods can be used.
In considering the effects of changing the overall advisor population size, we found that
using very large populations posed a more challenging situation in terms of memory con-
sumption and the time of execution required. In particular, the means by which we created
and sorted advisor networks for the primary buyer (as well as for each advisor, assuming
we wanted to allow referrals) adds the most computational complexity, as described as
follows:
• If there is a total of n buyer (advisor) agents in the system, sorting the advisor
network for one of those agents using an algorithm such as merge sort will take
O(n log n) (other sorting algorithms may of course take longer).
4Note that unlike Figure 3.6, in this case we did perform additional simulations for the proportional
max nbors cases using the smaller advisor population. We chose not to interpolate values from our earlier
results due to the wide variations in MAE noted previously for TRAVOS.
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• In PTM, there is one advisor network for each of the n buyer agents, yielding com-
plexity of O(n2 log n).
• In TRAVOS, as we reason about the seller being considered when computing the
trustworthiness value of an advisor, there are in effect k advisor networks to be
computed for each buyer (where k is the number of sellers), such that the complexity
will be O(kn2 log n).
We thus considered the possibility of using a variant in which the advisor population
considered for the purposes of our limiting mechanisms (both for thresholding and for
max nbors) would be restricted to a fraction of the total population size. This would be
different than max nbors in that in this case, the “new” population would be a randomly-
selected sample of the advisors, and not necessarily the most trustworthy among them.
Our hypothesis was that using a smaller, randomly-selected sample, with a size on the
order of that considered in the earlier work, would still allow us to avail of agents with
a range of experiences, not to mention a range of honesties. We felt that we should still
be able to avail of a sufficient supply of information to improve the accuracy of our trust
modelling.
To test this hypothesis, we performed the following modifications to our algorithm,
using PTM as the trust model: The buyer and the advisors would each interact as usual
with sellers to build each agent’s set of experiences. Following the procedure, the buyer
would then proceed to select a pre-determined number of advisors to act as its own advisor
“population”, and use the PTM to model the trust it should hold in each of these advisors.
This randomly-selected population would then optionally be limited using max nbors or
thresholding as applicable. For completeness, each of the advisors (being themselves buyer
agents) would likewise randomly select the same number of advisors – but, we emphasize,
not the same composition of advisors – for its own population; however, we believe this
was not consequential since we did not test referrals at this stage.
We then tested this scenario using a “reduced” population of 100 advisors out of a total
population of either 100 (our baseline), 500, or 1000. This was tested with both 30% and
60% lying advisors (LA), and for both the max nbors and thresholding techniques, using
44
a small selection of parameters in each case. The simulations all used a seller population of
100, and were otherwise identical to the other max nbors- or thresholding-only experiments
documented in Section 3.3.1.
The results of these simulations are shown in Figures 3.8a and 3.8b – each graph
represents a selection for the total population size and the percentage of lying advisors,
with the x-axis representing a max nbors or threshold parameter, and the y-axis indicating
the mean absolute error (MAE) in the trust model for that simulation. For greater clarity,
the graphs representing the 30% LA simulations are drawn with dashed lines, while those
showing the 60% LA scenarios are drawn with solid lines.
While the results were not identical for each of these cases, on the whole it seems
that trust-modelling accuracy (as represented here by the MAE) was very similar for all
of the populations chosen – for each combination of LA percentage and limiting method
(max nbors or thresholding), the graphs for the differing populations are generally quite
consistent. Any incongruities in the data shown seem to be very small, and not necessarily
unexpected given the probabilistic nature of the PTM.
It may be worthwhile to try additional population sizes for advisors and sellers, as
well additional sizes for the random-selection population, to more convincingly prove this
point. Moreover, it would also be useful to include referrals into future simulations to
verify its usefulness under these scenarios – indeed, in these cases referrals may prove to be
even more useful, since an advisor’s advisor network might include additional experienced
agents that were not included in the buyer’s random selections, and thus not previously
considered as advisors. However, from our results to date, it seems very likely that random
selection of a subset of the advisor population will indeed be sufficient to achieve trust
accuracy roughly equivalent to that achieved by using the entire population.
3.3.5 Experimental Conclusions
These results suggest to us that our proposed optimizations – max nbors and thresholding
– can be expected to help model trust more accurately in other trust approaches, at least
those similar to the PTM and TRAVOS – for example, the Beta Reputation System [13].
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(a) Results when applying max nbors
(b) Results when applying thresholding
Figure 3.8: Verification testing for the modifications.
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Moreover, although the exact “optimal” parameters will likely differ from one system to
the next, our results suggest that, for PTM, once the applicable threshold or max nbors
value has been determined for one population, the same values (in the case of max nbors,
the same proportion) can be used for other populations. In turn this could simplify these
calculations greatly since it may only take a small population, perhaps 20 or smaller,
to accurately determine the optimal threshold or (proportionate) max nbors values. For
TRAVOS, however, our results suggest that separate computations must be performed for
different advisor population sizes.
In comparing the experimental results from max nbors and thresholding in this chapter
– particularly those in Figures 3.3a and 3.3b – we note that, for PTM, the best-performing
threshold parameters seem to yield slightly lower trust-modelling error compared to the
best-performing max nbors parameters, at least among the specific parameter choices
tested here. On the other hand, however, as seen in Section 3.3.2, the best max nbors
choice for TRAVOS is slightly better than the best thresholding choice in that case. As
a result, we do not feel that we have seen enough evidence to say that one approach or
the other is “better”; rather, we conclude that they both provide satisfactory results, and
that the best option may depend on the particular trust model and other aspects of the
scenario.
We will provide some more general suggestions to the research community about how
to apply these techniques in Section 5.1, and then how to determine the appropriate pa-






We wish to consider the possibility of combining some population-limiting mechanism –
such as one or both of the methods discussed in the previous chapter – with an advisor-
referral technique inspired by the one in [39] and discussed in Section 2.3. We diverge
somewhat from the suggestions in [39] insofar as the PTM does not require us to query
each advisor for a recommendation. Rather, the buyer has access to each advisor’s ratings
for a given seller s via a central server, and uses this data, weighted by the buyer’s trust
in each advisor, to determine the public (or network) reputation for the seller.
We thus consider that advisors can “advise” by allowing buyers to make use of each ad-
visor’s own private reputation for a certain seller. In this case, an advisor “referral” system
could be implemented using a variant of the measure used to weight private reputation in
the original PTM (that is, Equation 2.5). This would work as follows: For each advisor aj
in the advisor network of b, that is, the set Ab = {a1, a2, . . . , ak}, b checks whether advisor
aj is an acceptable advisor for the seller s. This will be the case if N
aj
all ≥ NRE, where
N
aj
all is the number of ratings provided by an advisor aj for s, and NRE (or simply RE)
is some minimum number of ratings, representing the amount of experience (i.e., number
of interactions, being equivalent to the number of ratings) that an advisor must have had
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with the seller in order to be used. (We will explore shortly how to select an appropriate
value for NRE.)
If aj is not an acceptable advisor (that is, if N
aj
all < NRE), the algorithm will query
aj’s own advisor network, which we would expect should be different from that of b since
each buyer / advisor agent creates its own model of how much to trust each other agent.1
The advisors in this network are sorted from most trustworthy to least trustworthy from
the perspective of aj, and are examined in order to determine, in a similar fashion to the
examination of aj itself, which (if any) of the advisors in aj’s advisor network meet the
criteria to be a suitable advisor for s. The first such advisor encountered that is itself not
either (a) already in the set of acceptable advisors; or (b) in Ab — since this would imply
that the recommended advisor would be added in any event at a later stage — will be
accepted into the set of acceptable advisors, As.
This has the effect of “replacing” aj in the advisor network with respect to the calcula-
tions for s: the new advisor will be treated exactly the same way that aj would have been,
with the substitution of its data (and b’s trust in the replacement advisor) for that of aj.
However, this “replacement” only applies with respect to s; the algorithm will begin anew
with the original advisor network Ab for subsequent sellers.
If none of the advisors of aj meet the criteria stated above, the step would be repeated
at each subsequent level of the network — that is, the advisors of each member of the set
of advisors just considered — until an acceptable, unduplicated advisor was identified, and
then accepted into As, again serving as a “replacement” for aj.
However, this recursion is subject to limitations, since it is not guaranteed that there
are at least k buyers that have each had at least NRE interactions with s. To ensure broad
coverage of the network while preventing infinite recursion, we limit the number of network
“levels” calculated to at most maxnetlevel = dlogk(|B|)e, where B is the set of all buyers
(advisors) in the system.2 If, after searching maxnetlevel levels, no acceptable advisor has
been found to replace aj, no replacement advisor will be accepted into As, and the system
1We assume for the purposes of this discussion that these advisor networks can be retrieved from a
central server, as with the ratings themselves in the PTM.
2We note that practically, in a large scale system, the number of levels may need to be smaller in order
for this algorithm to be computationally efficient; we will leave such a decision for later work.
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will use a reduced set to determine the network reputation — that is, the size of As will
be less than k.
Once the set of acceptable advisors has been determined, the “network” reputation
would be calculated as in the original model, using the advisor trustworthiness values held
by the buyer b.
We summarize this mechanism in pseudo-code format as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Referring Advisors to Buyer b for Trustworthiness of Seller s
1: Ab = {a1, a2, . . . , ak}; {advisors in b’s advisor network}
2: As = {}; {set of advisors that are suitable for providing advice regarding seller s}
3: NRE = minimum number of ratings for a to be a suitable advisor regarding s;
4: maxnetlevel = dlogk(|B|)e {the maximum number of search iterations}
5: for j = 1 to k do
6: N
aj
all = total number of ratings provided by aj for s;
7: if N
aj
all ≥ NRE then
8: append aj to As;
9: else
10: netlevel = 2; {no. of connections between b and the advisors being searched}
11: ax = null; {the desired suitable advisor in place of aj}
12: Ac = the set of advisors for aj sorted from most to least trustworthy (as per aj);
13: while ax == null and netlevel ≤ maxnetlevel do
14: An = {}; {the set of advisors to be considered in the next round, if necessary}
15: for all ac in Ac do
16: Nacall = total number of ratings provided by ac for s;
17: if Nacall ≥ NRE and ac /∈ Ab and ac /∈ As then
18: ax = ac;
19: break;
20: else
21: add the set of advisors for ac to An;
22: end if
23: end for
24: netlevel + +;
25: Ac = An
26: end while
27: if ax 6= null then






We now provide examples demonstrating the effects of adding our advisor referral mech-
anism to the PTM where max nbors or thresholding is already applied. The examples
in this section continue on from those outlined in Section 3.2, in which we showed how
max nbors and thresholding would be applied to a system initially consisting of a buyer b;
four advisors, aw, ax, ay, and az; and six sellers, s0 through s5. The buyer and each advisor
each had a separate set of interactions (and thus ratings) with each seller, as indicated in
Tables 3.1 and 3.3.
We now introduce a new advisor into the system, av, as well as an additional seller, s6.
To this point av has only provided ratings for s6, while b has not provided any ratings for
that seller; therefore there are no commonly-rated sellers for av and b, and thus Tr(av) = 0.5
from the perspective of b.
We also assume, as in the max nbors = 3 or L = 0.4 cases described in Section 3.2,
that the advisor network for the buyer b consists of the set of advisors {aw, ax, ay} — av is
too new to have been considered as a potential advisor in that case, although for purposes
of demonstration we assume that av has somehow been included in the advisor networks
of some of the other advisors. Finally we set NRE, the minimum amount of experience (in
terms of number of ratings) for an advisor to be considered acceptable for a given seller, as
3. The ratings that have been given by each advisor, and the resulting discounted amounts,
are as shown in Table 4.1.
Given this information, the buyer b will examine its advisor network and find that
aw and ax are indeed acceptable advisors for s6, since both have achieved at least NRE
interactions with s6. However, ay has only had one interaction with s6, and would therefore
not be considered an acceptable advisor. The buyer will then look to ay’s advisor network
to identify an appropriate substitute.
Suppose then that ay also has a three-agent advisor network consisting of av, ax, and
az, with trustworthiness values 0.5, 0.6, and 0.7 respectively.
3 This information will be
3For clarity, only ay’s own regular advisor network is considered, even if ay has itself used referrals in
modelling its own trust in s6.
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Table 4.1: Ratings of s6 Provided by Advisors
(a) Ratings
Ti T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
av 1 1 0 1 1
aw 0 1 1 0 -
ax 1 0 1 - -
ay 0 - - - -
az 1 1 - - -
(b) Amounts of Ratings
Ti T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
Navpos,i 1 1 0 1 1
Navneg,i 0 0 1 0 0
Nawpos,i 0 1 1 0 -
Nawneg,i 1 0 0 1 -
Naxpos,i 1 0 1 - -
Naxneg,i 0 1 0 - -
N
ay
pos,i 0 - - - -
N
ay
neg,i 1 - - - -
Nazpos,i 1 1 - - -
Nazneg,i 0 0 - - -
(c) Discounted Amounts of Ratings
Ti T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
Davpos,i 0.4 0.4 0 0.4 0.4
Davneg,i 0 0 0.4 0 0
Dawpos,i 0 0.397 0.397 0 -
Dawneg,i 0.397 0 0 0.397 -
Daxpos,i 0.937 0 0.937 - -
Daxneg,i 0 0.937 0 - -
D
ay
pos,i 0 - - - -
D
ay
neg,i 0.375 - - - -
Dazpos,i 0.0294 0.0294 - - -
Dazneg,i 0 0 - - -
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gathered by b as the ordered list {az, ax, av}. The buyer will then iterate through the set,
discarding az as an unacceptable advisor (having provided only two ratings for s6), and
also ax as it is already in b’s advisor network. Finally, b would then accept av as the third
advisor, as it has an acceptable level of experience with s6 but is not part of b’s own advisor
network.
As in the previous examples, b does not itself have enough experience with s6 to gen-
erate a private reputation. Therefore, using the above information for the set of advisors
{av, aw, ax}, the forgetting factor (as defined in Section 2.1.1) λ = 0.9, and Equation 2.10,
we find that Tr(s6) = 0.6655.
If b had not used advisor referrals but instead relied solely on its existing advisor
network, namely {aw, ax, ay}, it would have obtained a significantly different result —
Tr(s6) = 0.5549. However, the latter result makes much less use of the experience within
the network for s6 than did the one incorporating advisor referrals.
4.3 Experimental Results
We refer the reader to the beginning of Section 3.3 for a summary of pertinent information
regarding the experimental setup of the simulations for this thesis.
4.3.1 Verifying Effectiveness
In Section 3.3.1, we conducted several simulations of the PTM using one buyer, 80 advisors,
and 100 sellers, with each buyer and advisor interacting with 80 randomly-chosen sellers,
to test the effectiveness of max nbors and thresholding using several possible parameters.
We now repeat these simulations using a small subset of the best-performing cases using
advisor referrals. Specifically we chose max nbors = 40 and threshold = 0.55 based on
the results in Section 3.3.1, as well as max nbors = 15, which as noted in that section
did not perform significantly worse compared to setting a maximum size of 40, in order to
test whether the smaller size might (by itself) cause any differences in later simulations.
Referrals were applied with the required minimum number of experiences (NRE) set to
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1, the most that would have been available in this scenario since we had prohibited each
advisor from interacting with each seller more than once.
The results of these simulations, as compared to the equivalent versions without advisor
referrals, are shown in Figures 4.1a and 4.1b. These graphs show that using the referral
mechanism results in accuracy about as good as, if not better than, that of the correspond-
ing variant without referrals, in almost all cases, indicating that applying referrals should
not significantly reduce the accuracy of the trust model. This is not entirely surprising
for these scenarios, since in each case the size of the advisor network has already been
optimized to provide the best results, with a sufficient number of users having expertise
with most, if not all, sellers.
A summary view is provided as Figure 4.2, consisting of a scatterplot showing how
each of the variants tested performed, for both the 30% and 60% lying advisor cases, with
or without referrals (when possible).4 As in the summary figures used in Section 3.3, the
y-axis represents the mean absolute error (MAE) of each of the variants in calculating
the trustworthiness of sellers as compared to the “ideal” trust model discussed previously.
Note that in some cases, two or more data points (icons) overlap, indicating that the MAE
for those simulations were approximately equal (the order in which they overlap is not
meaningful). Again, as the data points corresponding to the referral-based variants are
almost always at about the same level as those of their non-referral equivalents, we can
conclude that adding referrals will generally yield about the same accuracy as if referrals
are not used. Further evaluation of the effect of referrals will be discussed in the next
subsection.
4.3.2 Using Referrals to Further Reduce Network Size
We have shown above that using max nbors or thresholding to limit the size of the advisor
network will significantly improve the accuracy of the trust values calculated for each
seller. We have further shown that, given certain “optimal” choices for the max nbors or
4Specifically, simulations were not conducted for referrals where neither max nbors or thresholding is
used, since referrals are of no effect unless the advisor network has already been limited.
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(a) 30% lying advisors
(b) 60% lying advisors
Figure 4.1: Comparison of approaches with and without referrals.
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Figure 4.2: Mean average error of compared trust models, both with and without referrals.
threshold values, using advisor referrals will achieve at least approximately the same level
of accuracy compared to when referrals are not used.
However, we believe that referrals could be useful when using a smaller advisor network,
i.e. a smaller value of max nbors or a higher trustworthiness threshold. Such a scenario
might arise due to a need for limiting memory and processing; this will be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 6. In this scenario, it is less likely that the advisors within the
network will have a sufficient level of experience – if any experience – in dealing with each
and every seller in the system. Here, then, we would expect referred advisors to be more
useful in regards to filling in the gaps in experience.
With this in mind, we proceeded to a modified version of the above evaluation that
would allow for a greater role for referrals. The parameters and test conditions were
the same, except that we reduced the number of sellers to 40, and increased the number
of simulation days to 120. We also adopted pure random selection for the sellers, such
that buyers would rate each seller a variable number of times (on average three), whereas
previously they could rate each seller at most once.
Simulations were then performed in this environment using several variations incor-
porating max nbors or thresholding, as well as referrals. A subset of these simulations,
using max nbors = 2 where 30% of the advisors are dishonest, are shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of trust models (max nbors = 2, 30% lying advisors (LA)
The independent variable in this case is the use of referrals and, if referrals are used, the
amount of experience required from the referred advisors (NRE), which is varied from one
to ten. As in the previous subsection, the graph displays each variation’s average trust
value for the sellers with the indicated probability of lying. Also shown for comparison is
the “ideal” trust model where the calculated average trust value exactly corresponds to the
sellers’ probability of dishonesty – the straight diagonal line; as well as the “worst-case”
scenario where all of the advisors are excluded, yielding an average trustworthiness of 0.5
regardless – the horizontal line.
It is clear, based on comparing the closeness of each of the variations’ graphs to the
“ideal” graph, that while setting a maximum size for the advisor network yields a more
accurate trust model, adding referrals in this case results in a further non-trivial improve-
ment. Furthermore, increasing the NRE value – the experience with the seller that each
referred advisor must have – serves to improve the model further; an experience level of four
– just above the expected average noted above – comes closest to matching the best-case
scenario.
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(a) Error comparison for various max nbors + referrals approaches with 30% LA
(b) Error comparison for various max nbors + referrals approaches with 60%
LA
Figure 4.4: Evaluation of effects of referrals on small max nbors advisor networks.
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However, demanding a much higher level of experience reduces the number of available
advisors significantly, approaching the worst-case scenario if anNRE value of ten is required.
As we noted above, the average number of experiences that an advisor should have with
each seller is three, making a much higher value like ten a very rare occurrence in this
simulation. If none of the advisors have met the minimum NRE value for any of the sellers,
no advisors will be included in the advisor network, and the level of seller trust will revert to
0.5, the default value if no ratings are available. This is not unlike what was encountered in
Section 3.3.1 with regards to thresholding; in both cases, an unrealistically high parameter
will result in no useful information being obtained. These results will, in turn, will serve to
increase the overall trust-modelling error associated with the scenario being tested – not
because the more highly experienced advisors are incorrect, but rather due to very few (if
any) sufficiently-experienced advisors being available.
Additional simulation results are shown in summary view as figures 4.4a and 4.4b,
which are for 30% and 60% lying advisors, respectively. Each graph represents a single
possible value for max nbors. The positions on the x-axis represent the NRE value used
for referrals, if any, except for the position at the far left which indicates the results if
neither max nbors nor thresholding is used. The y-axis indicates the mean absolute error
for each of the variants measured, which is the same as outlined for the summary views in
the previous subsection.
For max nbors = 15 – identified in Section 3.3.1 as one of the “optimal” network sizes
for an advisor population of 80 – using referrals seems to give an improvement, albeit
extremely slight. However, for a smaller network such as max nbors = 2, the improvement
is much more pronounced, as indicated by the reduced error for the max nbors = 2 graph if
the experience level is set to NRE = 3 or NRE = 4. For example, while using max nbors = 2
without referrals in the 60% lying advisors had an MAE of 0.081, allowing for referrals with
an NRE value of 4 led to a significantly smaller MAE of 0.054. Although this does not
overcome the benefits of using a largermax nbors value – for example, settingmax nbors =
5 without using referrals resulted in an MAE of 0.034 – these results are still much closer
in terms of accuracy.
Figure 4.5 shows a similar set of simulations for various possible threshold levels, again
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showing how different combinations of thresholds (graphs) and referral experience levels
(x-axis) affect the mean error of each trust model variant (y-axis). These figures show
that, as with max nbors, adding referrals with an appropriately-chosen experience level in
combination with thresholding can reduce the error in the trust model for higher thresholds
– but only up to a point. If the threshold is set so high that some buyers end up having
advisor networks of size 1 or 0 (as appears to be the case for using a threshold of 0.8), then
referrals could end up being quite ineffective.
We conclude that our evaluation indicates that referrals can serve to improve the ac-
curacy of the trust model if the size of the advisor network is very limited, such as if there
is a very low maximum number of advisors, or a very high trustworthiness threshold.
4.3.3 Applicability to Alternative Model
Continuing from the results in Section 3.3.2, we now look at examining the effect of ad-
visor referrals using TRAVOS. Again, as with our work in the previous subsection, this is
performed using a modified version of the scenario in Section 3.3.2, with the number of
sellers reduced to 40, and each buyer or advisor submitting 120 seller ratings, with no limit
on the number of times each seller could be chosen.
The results for these tests are shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. As with the earlier figures,
these are summary graphs which indicate the mean absolute error obtained for various
combinations of minimum referral experience (NRE) and max nbors / threshold param-
eters; each series represents a different max nbors or threshold value, while the x-axis
indicates the corresponding NRE value. Like the results for PTM (see Figures 4.4 and
4.5), these graphs show that for low values of max nbors, where the advisor network size
is very small, using referrals will provide a reduction in error (that is, a trust model with
improved accuracy). When using thresholding, similar reductions in error were observed
by adding advisor referrals to networks using high threshold values (and hence having a
small size). However, reductions in error were also occasionally seen for larger networks
(those produced by using smaller thresholds); such improvements were rarely seen when
applying referrals to large networks using PTM.
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(a) Error comparison for various thresholding + referrals approachs with 30%
LA
(b) Error comparison for various thresholding + referrals approachs with 60%
LA
Figure 4.5: Evaluation of effects of referrals on advisor networks.
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(a) Comparison for 30% LA
(b) Comparison for 60% LA
Figure 4.6: Comparison of mean absolute error in TRAVOS using advisor referrals when
varying max nbors and the minimum level of referral experience (NRE)
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(a) Comparison for 30% LA
(b) Comparison for 60% LA
Figure 4.7: Comparison of mean absolute error in TRAVOS using advisor referrals when
varying the trust threshold and the minimum NRE level
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In comparing the results for using thresholding with TRAVOS with those achieved using
thresholding with PTM, we do note one anomaly. As shown in Figures 4.5a and 4.5b, the
trust model error increases significantly for the PTM approach for all NRE values when
the threshold reaches 0.8. However, such increases did not occur for TRAVOS; as shown
in Figures 4.7a and 4.7b, the error in that trust model for high thresholds (0.8 and 0.9) did
not increase as significantly as they did for PTM; indeed, simulations using TRAVOS had
overall lower error than those using PTM when applying a threshold of 0.8 to both cases.
The high error that is seen in PTM when applying larger threshold values is generally
due to the buyer having modelled very few, if any, of the advisors with such a high threshold,
which leads in turn to insufficient information to model the trust of sellers (and assigning
the default trust value of 0.5). In comparison, during our simulations, TRAVOS would
assign high trust values, on the order of 0.8 or 0.9, to advisors more frequently, potentially
because that model uses a more fine-grained model of advisor trust based on the advisor,
the buyer, and the seller under consideration (whereas PTM calculates an overall value
based only on the buyer and advisor). Accordingly, setting a high threshold would not
affect the amount of information available to TRAVOS in the same way that it would
PTM, leading to the more accurate results in this case.
4.3.4 Effects for Larger Populations
We now turn to testing advisor referrals with PTM for the large advisor population case
previously examined in Section 3.3.3. Again, we use the modified scenario used for the
advisor referral simulations performed in the earlier sections of this chapter, except with an
advisor population of 500. However, we felt it was unnecessary to consider the same number
of different minimum referral experience (NRE) parameters as in the smaller-population
case in order to demonstrate how the trust prediction accuracy changes as the NRE value
increases. We therefore restricted our simulations in this regard to a handful of NRE values
which, we considered, would nevertheless show any significant trends in the results.
We first consider how the larger population performs when thresholding and referrals
are used in combination, as shown in Figures 4.8a and 4.8b. The results are not identical
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for the two population sizes – there is a generally smaller trust-modelling error for the
larger population when high NRE values are used – but for the cases of greatest interest,
specifically small advisor networks resulting from high thresholds, using modestly-chosen
NRE values, there are still improvements when adding referrals to these networks. Indeed,
for a threshold of 0.8, the positive effects of adding referrals are much more pronounced
in the larger population than in the 80-advisor scenario, particularly for NRE = 4. We
attribute this to the fact that more highly-trusted advisors will be available in the larger
population, which would make a significant difference considering that perhaps only one
or two advisors would survive the thresholding process using the smaller population.
Next we look at using max nbors and referrals in combination, using max nbors values
of similar proportions relative to the population size, as shown in Figures 4.9a and 4.9b.
In this case, applying both techniques to a large network results in very similar, and in
some cases (particularly for NRE = 8) much lower accuracy error compared to the smaller
network. It seems safe to conclude that using referrals with a large advisor population will
not only be effective in general, but that it will yield trust modelling accuracy at least as
good as that obtained with a smaller population.
We can thus expect that advisor referrals can help to model trust more accurately in
other trust approaches such as BRS [13]. Indeed, our findings indicate that as the size of
the advisor population increases, the benefits of using advisor referrals with regards to the
accuracy of the trust model will also increase.
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(a) Comparison when varying threshold (30% LA)
(b) Comparison when varying threshold (60% LA)
Figure 4.8: Comparison of mean absolute error in PTM using advisor referrals, varying
threshold and minimum NRE, when advisor population is 500
67
(a) Comparison when varying max nbors (30% LA)
(b) Comparison when varying max nbors (60% LA)
Figure 4.9: Comparison of mean absolute error in PTM using advisor referrals, varying




5.1 Applying Techniques to Other Trust Models
In Chapters 3 and 4, we showed that our proposed modifications –max nbors, thresholding,
and advisor referrals – can lead to improvements in trust modelling accuracy with both the
PTM [43] and TRAVOS [32]. We now move on to describe how other trust researchers can
apply our proposals to their own models in order to improve the accuracy of these models.
In order for these improvements to be effective, the model must be such that the
primary goal is for some individual agent (for example, in the case of PTM, a “buyer”)
to model the trust of each agent or item in some pre-defined group (in PTM, “sellers”),
and that in doing so, it makes use of information about some separate group of agents (in
PTM, “advisors”). For simplicity we will use the terminology from PTM for the balance
of this section, but we emphasize that we intend for these techniques to be applicable in
any domain where such a model could be used. We assume that some existing test code
implementing the trust model has already been written, verified, and optimized using any
existing parameters in the trust model.
The code should then be modified to allow for the following:
• If the thresholding technique is being applied, some data structure should be used
to hold information about the advisors that have trust values exceeding the pre-
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determined threshold, as well as the trust values themselves. As the trust values for
each of the potential advisors are determined, the code should compare each value
with the threshold and, if and only if this value meets or exceeds the threshold,
add the advisor (and its corresponding trust value) to the data structure. Subse-
quently, the trust value for each seller should be determined by only making use of
the information provided by the advisors included in this data structure.
• If max nbors is used instead, a similar data structure should be used to store in-
formation about advisors and their trustworthiness values, although in this case the
advisors will need to be sorted from most trustworthy to least trustworthy. In gen-
eral it will suffice to set a maximum of max nbors items for this structure, with
less trustworthy advisors being removed as more trustworthy advisors are found and
added. In any event, once the advisors have been sorted, only the first max nbors
items in the sorted data structure should be used to calculate the trustworthiness of
sellers.
• Turning to the advisor referral technique:
– Advisor referrals are used in conjunction with thresholding and max nbors,
and thus the same processes should be used as if either of these two techniques
were being used on its own – with one exception. The referral process we have
proposed assumes that even if trust thresholding is used, the advisors will be
sorted from most trustworthy to least, such that when a buyer is attempting to
get an referral from an advisor, the latter will consider its own advisors from
most trustworthy to least. As a result, sorting must be employed regardless of
whether max nbors or thresholding is used initially.
– To perform the referral mechanism itself, the code must include a mechanism
for checking whether an existing advisor in the advisor network has met or
surpassed a set referral experience (NRE) level, with regards to the number
of experiences that advisor has had with the seller under consideration. The
advisor itself will be used if the minimum NRE level has been achieved by that
advisor. Otherwise, the code must examine all of that advisor’s own advisors,
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from most trustworthy to least trustworthy, and if necessary the advisors of the
advisors just considered, and so on, until either an acceptable advisor (i.e. one
that has met the minimum NRE value) has been found, or the maximum number
of recursion levels has been exceeded. Further details about the algorithm is
found in Section 4.1.
• In certain trust models, such as TRAVOS, the model is such that a separate trust
value is calculated for each combination of buyer, advisor, and seller – that is, how
much the buyer trusts the advisor to provide accurate information specifically about a
single seller. In this case, regardless of the technique(s) used, the model will require an
enlarged data structure (or multiple structures) to contain all this information. The
threshold will then need to be applied separately for each seller under consideration.
• If there is any existing functionality in the original model that resembles these tech-
niques, such features should be disabled. For example, the original PTM only used
“trustworthy” advisors – advisors for which the buyer’s trust value was greater than
0.5 – equivalent to setting a threshold of 0.5.
5.1.1 Optimizing the Modifications
Each of the proposed modifications introduces at least one new parameter into the trust
model, specifically:
• max nbors, when setting a maximum size for the advisor network
• threshold, when using trustworthiness thresholding
• minimum NRE, when using advisor referrals
Our work in Chapters 3 and 4 has indicated that the parameters in each of these tech-
niques should not be applied blindly: there may be significant changes in the accuracy of
the trust model as the applicable parameters are changed upwards or downwards. Accord-
ingly, we suggest that trust researchers seeking to use these techniques should be careful
in selecting the optimal parameters for their particular trust model.
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It is not our present belief that such parameters could be found in a deterministic
fashion – the properties of, or distinctions between, different trust models cannot be easily
reduced to numerical values. We instead advise researchers to use the empirical route: test
several reasonable options, then use the combinations that provide the best performance.
Our recommended test procedure, based on the work in [44] and earlier in this thesis,
is as follows:
Run a simulation of the model with a single “buyer” agent, and a sufficient number of
both advisors and sellers such that the number of interactions between either the buyer or
a single advisor on the one hand, and a single seller on the other hand, will be insignificant
compared to the total number of interactions. In other words, the numbers must be
sufficiently large to ensure that any outliers that may exist in the data have an insignificant
effect on the overall results. That said, we suspect that the exact choices in terms of the
numbers of agents used will not be particularly meaningful, insofar as we saw no noticeable
difference in the results upon increasing or decreasing these numbers slightly. We will
suggest, arbitrarily, that using at least 40 sellers, and at least 80 advisors, seems to be
sufficient to obtain reliable results.
Run this simulation such that the buyer and each advisor has at least one experience
with a sufficient number of sellers that any outliers will have little effect – for example, fol-
lowing our procedure, if there are 80 sellers, each agent might have one or more interactions
with 60 of those sellers.1 This will suffice by itself if testing max nbors or thresholding
alone. However, when testing advisor referrals with NRE > 1, the buyer and each advisor
should normally have multiple interactions with each seller. In this case, the number of
experiences (and/or the number of sellers) should be adjusted to ensure that each advisor
has achieved the required number of experiences (i.e., the NRE value) for some, but not all
sellers, in order to adequately test the referral mechanism. For example, if testing an NRE
1The exact number or proportion to use will depend on the domain being considered. For example, on
an online auction marketplace with a large user population, such as eBay, it is highly unlikely that any
given buyer will come in contact with even a small fraction of the entire population of sellers. As such,
it might be more appropriate to choose 10 or 20 sellers, or use a larger seller population, in such cases.
At the same time, a buyer with a specific interest, e.g. stamp collecting, might come in contact with a
significant proportion of the sellers concerned with that particular interest. Likewise, when purchasing an
“information good”, having multiple experiences with a seller may not be unrealistic.
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value of 5 with a seller population of 80, the test might be such that each advisor makes
400 interactions, each time randomly selecting one of the 80 sellers. In such a case, while,
on average, an advisor will have had five interactions with each seller, the specific value
associated with each advisor-seller pair may be different.
Regardless of the number of sellers, they should be divided into multiple disjoint trust-
worthiness categories, each containing the same number of sellers. Each category is assigned
a different probability that the seller will act dishonestly (P (d)), which is then assigned
to the sellers. For example, the evaluation in Section 3.3.1 divided the sellers into ten
equal groups, one with P (d) = 0, another with P (d) = 0.1, and so on up to the tenth
group with P (d) = 0.9. Then, each time a seller interacts with a buyer or advisor, it will
choose whether to act honestly or dishonestly via random selection – for example, it could
randomly choose an integer between 0 and 9, and act dishonestly if the chosen integer is
less than 10P (d), and honestly otherwise. The expected values for each of those sellers in
an ideal trust model would then be 1−P (d), such that a seller for which P (d) = 0.3 would
be expected to be assigned a trust value of 0.7.
In regards to the honesty of advisors, the simulations should be run in two sets: one
where advisors are mostly reporting honestly when rating sellers, and one where advisors
are mostly lying about their experiences. For example, in the first set, advisors might lie
in their seller ratings 30% of the time; in the second set, this probability might increase to
60%.
At this point, depending on which techniques are desired to be used, several options
for the appropriate parameters – either max nbors or the trust threshold, and optionally
the minimum NRE – should be identified for the simulations. As a guideline, our earlier
results testing PTM and TRAVOS in e-commerce seem to suggest that the optimal value
for max nbors is likely to be in the range of 20% to 40% of the total size of the advisor
population, while if thresholding is used, the threshold value should be set between 0.5 and
0.6. If referrals are used, our results suggest that the optimum value for the minimum NRE
is likely to be between 1 and 5. These values might potentially vary for other models and
other domains, although we would suggest that for thresholding, 0.5 should be an intuitive
minimum threshold – if the trustworthiness of the advisor is below 50%, it should not be
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worth considering.
The simulation for each option being considered should be repeated several times (at
least five to ten) and then averaged, to help negate the effect of any outliers that appear.
Once the simulations are complete, find the mean absolute error – the average of the
absolute differences between the expected and experimental trust values for all of the
sellers – for each simulation. The option yielding the lowest mean absolute error will then
indicate the optimal parameter(s).
We now provide an overview of the application of our modifications in order to test
their effectiveness, in pseudo-code format, as Algorithms 3 and 4. This is one example of
how to apply the procedure; refer to the information provided above for more details as to
how to set the specific parameters outlined in these algorithms.
5.2 Selecting Appropriate Parameters
In our work, we have noted that either using trustworthiness thresholding or setting a
maximum number of advisors will provide a modest improvement to the accuracy of the
trust model. Moreover, in cases where the size of the advisor network is very small, using
referrals may help to further improve the accuracy of this model.
Our results indicate that the parameters to be used should be modestly sized – allowing
a reasonable number of advisors to be used, without including a large number of advisors
that contribute little to the calculations of the trust model. Additionally, our results
suggest how to set the actual value of the parameters. In particular, they indicate that
the range of 0.5 to 0.6 is optimal for threshold parameters, while a max nbors parameter
should be set as roughly 20% to 40% of the total size of the population.
5.2.1 Comparison with Collaborative Filtering
Interestingly these results seem to diverge from those found for collaborative filtering
(CF), as in [9]. We first describe their experimental setup: For both the thresholding
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Algorithm 3 Testing Modifications with a Trust Model: Determine Advisor Trusts
1: advisorLying = 0.3; {fraction of advisors that lie}
2: numAdvisors = 80; {number of advisors}
3: numSellers = 40; {number of sellers}
4: numDays = 120; {number of interactions by each buyer or advisor with a seller}
5: b = {b0, b1, b2, . . . , bnumAdvisors}; {b0 is the true “buyer”, others are advisors}
6: s = {s1, s2, . . . , snumSellers}; {sellers}
7: {Select dishonest advisors}
8: for i = 1 to numAdvisors do
9: {if advisor is among the fraction of advisors that should lie, set as lying}




14: {Select categories for sellers – each category represents percentage of dishonest behaviour}
15: dishonesties = {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, . . . , 0.9}; {for example}
16: for i = 1 to numSellers do
17: {get and set dishonesty based on seller’s category}
18: dishonesty = dishonesties[i mod dishonesties.length];
19: si.setDishonesty(dishonesty);
20: end for
21: for i = 1 to numDays do
22: {Run interaction simulations}
23: for j = 0 to numAdvisors do
24: {Repeat for buyer and all sellers}
25: sellerId = −1; {Select a seller}
26: while sellerId == −1 or (referralsUsed and bj .hasUsed(ssellerId) do
27: sellerId = random integer in range [1, numSellers];
28: end while
29: bj .addUsed(ssellerId);
30: {Is the seller lying this time?}
31: sellerLieState = random integer in range [0, 9];
32: sellerLying = (sellerLieState < 10ssellerId.getDishonesty());
{Determine rating buyer will assign to this interaction}
33: if bj .isLying() xor sellerLying then
34: rating = 0;
35: else
36: rating = 1;
37: end if
38: bj .addRating(ssellerId, rating);
39: end for
40: end for
41: {Determine how much the buyer trusts each advisor, then sort}
42: for i = 1 to numAdvisors do
43: determine advisorTrust for bi as applicable using the selected trust model;
44: b0.setAdvisorTrust(bi, advisorTrust);
45: end for
46: b0.sortAdvisorTrusts(); {in descending order}
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Algorithm 4 Testing Modifications with a Trust Model: Determine Seller Trusts
1: {Variables carried over from Algorithm 3}
2: b = {b0, b1, b2, . . . , bnumAdvisors}; {b0 is the true “buyer”, others are advisors}
3: s = {s1, s2, . . . , snumSellers}; {sellers}
4: numSellers = 40; numDays = 120;
5: {Get advisor network}
6: advisorNetwork = {};
7: advisorTrusts = b0.getAdvisorTrusts(); {for now, we will assume it’s an array}
8: if usingMaxNbors then
9: for i = 1 to maxNbors do
10: advisorNetwork.add(advisorTrusts[i].buyer());
11: end for
12: else if usingThreshold then
13: i = 1;
14: while advisorTrusts[i].trust() ≥ threshold do
15: advisorNetwork.add(advisorTrusts[i].buyer());
16: i + +;
17: end while
18: end if
{Model the trust for each seller}
19: for i = 1 to numSellers do
20: for j = 1 to numAdvisors do
21: advisor = bj ;
22: if usingReferrals and bj .getNumRatings(si) < minExperience then
23: set advisor to be a referred advisor using Algorithm 2
24: end if
25: if advisor 6= null then
26: determine contribution of advisor to b0’s trust model for si;
27: end if
28: end for
29: sellerTrusti = b0’s overall trust in si given contributions of advisors;
30: end for
{Determine average seller trust for each category}
31: totalAbsError = 0;
32: for i = 1 to dishonesties.length do
33: {category}
34: categoryTotal = 0;
35: numPerCategory = numSellers/dishonesties.length;
36: for j = 1 to numPerCategory do
37: {seller within category}
38: categoryTotal = categoryTotal + sellerTrustj ;
39: end for
40: categoryAvgi = categoryTotal/numPerCategory;
41: categoryAbsErri = abs(categoryAvgi − dishonesties[i]);
42: totalAbsError = totalAbsError + categoryAbsErri;
43: end for
44: meanAbsError = totalAbsError/dishonesties.length; {“overall” error for this simulation}
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and max nbors methods, different values were tested experimentally, in combination with
various other factors considered in that paper, in order to determine the best value, if any.
In essence, given an existing data set (specifically, a subset of the MovieLens film-rating
database), a small fraction of those ratings were first removed. Those ratings would then be
regenerated using a CF prediction algorithm using some combination of the factors being
tested, based on the remaining data. These generated ratings were then compared with the
original results. The main criterion observed was the mean absolute error (MAE) of the
predicted ratings – that is, the average of the absolute values of the differences between the
actual and expected ratings. No formulae were offered to suggest an analytical approach
to determining the appropriate threshold. We also note the authors’ caveat that although
they say they had reason to believe their results were generally applicable to other domains
besides film, they did not, at that point, have empirical evidence to prove this was the case.
The results in [9] suggested that thresholding would have little usefulness in a CF
system. In fact, for the MovieLens data set examined, correlation thresholding yielded
declines in both coverage and accuracy (that is, an increase in the MAE) compared to a
non-thresholded algorithm. Specifically, not using thresholding in this CF system would
yield an MAE of about 0.7528, while applying any threshold would result in an MAE that
was higher – sometimes only marginally, but going up to approximately 0.78 for a threshold
of 0.5. We note for completeness that [30] used a similar experimental method to [9] for
determining the best threshold for their music recommender system, and had no further
insight with regards to an analytical approach.
On the other hand, the results for max nbors indicated the benefits of a careful ap-
plication of this approach. Recall that using an unrestricted network in this CF system
would yield an MAE of about 0.7528. The results indicated that applying a max nbors
value between 20 and 80 (out of a population of 943 agents) would result in lower MAE,
with max nbors = 60 yielding the lowest average MAE of 0.7508 (although slightly smaller
max nbors values, between 20 and 40, would generally be about the same in terms of per-
formance). On the other hand, using a max nbors value of 5 or 10 would show increased
MAE (of 0.7836 and 0.7605 respectively), while max nbors = 100 (the highest value tested)
would show no improvement compared to the unrestricted network.
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It was concluded that a neighbourhood of 20 to 50 users would be a “reasonable”
size to provide an acceptable level of accuracy, providing an appropriate balance between
sufficient coverage and eliminating inaccuracies. Again, this result was specifically tested
with a population of 943, although the authors claim, based on experiments (not fully
documented in the paper) using all 80,000 users in the MovieLens database, that a similarly-
sized neighbourhood should be sufficient for most “real-world” scenarios, without regard
to population size.
This is an interesting contrast in our findings in Chapter 3, in that we encountered
very good results when applying trustworthiness thresholding, whereas for the max nbors
approach, setting the max nbors parameter as a proportion of the total advisor population
size (and not as a static value, or one within a small range) seemed to work best. Thus
it seems clear that there are strong distinctions between collaborative filtering and trust
modelling, at least in regards to how to select the best size for a social network in each
application.
5.2.2 Comparison with Advisor Referrals
Yu and Singh also explored, in a sense, the effects of varying of the number of agents used in
trust modelling. In [40], they discuss how to find “witness” agents that have interacted with
some goal agent Ag, and using information about the witnesses’ experiences to determine
the trustworthiness of that goal agent. To do so, they construct a trust network representing
the relationships between agents. Ultimately, agents in the trust network provide referrals
to other agents that are acquainted with Ag, which then comprise the set of witnesses.
(We discussed this scenario in greater detail in Section 2.3.)
For the experimental validation of this research, each agent was assigned a set of 16
acquaintances, out of a total of 100 agents in the system. Of these acquaintances, four
highly-trusted and highly-sociable would be designated as neighbours. Each agent was also
assigned a “branching factor”, between one and four, specifying how many referrals from
its set of neighbours it could provide at any one time.
Because only a low proportion of agents would be acquainted with any other agent,
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and due to limits on the depth of the trust network, the number of witnesses that would
be found would generally be quite low, typically within the range of 1 to 6 – much smaller
than the values considered in [9] (and that we examined in Chapter 3). However, the
number of witnesses found would increase as the branching factor increased, and (to a
lesser extent) as the depth of the trust network increased. When comparing the number of
witnesses generated to the average rating error, it was found that the prediction accuracy
would improve slightly, but not significantly, when more witnesses had been found.
However, due to the differences in their model in terms of finding witnesses, the fact that
the number of witnesses would be found after the fact (as opposed to being pre-determined),
and the use of a large number of simulation cycles using the scenario described above to
generate this trust – a luxury that does not apply to the trust models we have examined
– these results are not easily comparable to those presented in this thesis.
Nevertheless, the experimental results from this research seem to match our findings
in that, given a relatively small proportion of the advisor population that is regularly
consulted (i.e. the acquaintances in [40], or the advisor network in our approach), using
referrals is helpful in finding specific advisors that will be useful in evaluating a target
agent.
With regards to our referral mechanism, we noted in Section 4.1 that there is a limit
on the number of levels of advisors through which this algorithm will search when looking
for an acceptable replacement advisor. Presently this is set as dlogk(|B|)e, where B is the
set of all buyers (advisors) in the system, and k is the number of advisors in the buyer’s
own advisor network. This is intended to be a prediction of the approximate number of
advisor-network levels that one would need to examine in order to search all nodes. In
future work, we might examine whether using a different value might produce improved
results for referrals. A smaller value might help to reduce the amount of computation
required to perform a referrals search, particularly if some of the same advisors are being
redundantly examined multiple times. On the other hand, searching a larger number of
levels could ensure a more complete search for suitable advisors, thus ensuring the buyer
has more information in modelling the reputation of a seller.
79
5.3 Alternative Referral Trust Computation Methods
In our discussion of referrals in Chapter 4, we made the simplifying assumption that buy-
ers would continue to use their own previously-calculated trust models to represent the
trustworthiness they should hold in each referred advisor.
This method was chosen as it seemed to be the most efficient means of setting the trust
of each referred advisor, given that these trust values had already been calculated, whereas
using another method might require additional time-consuming calculations. As noted
above, this method will provide some positive results. However, it has some weaknesses:
first, it will not take into account the referring agents’ opinions of the referred agents.
Moreover, in the event that multiple agents make referrals to a single agent, the existing
method will not take this into account, even though the multiple referrals may indeed
suggest that this single agent should command more trust.
However, trust propagation, or defining an agent’s trust in another agent as a function
of all of the connections between them, has been studied extensively of late [15][8], and
might provide an even more accurate trust model, especially in a larger network.
In this section we will discuss some of the most relevant past work on this topic. We will
then propose several possible alternative representations of the trustworthiness of referred
advisors, and then outline potential future work on the matter.
5.3.1 Related Work
At least two works have attempted to implement methods for similar trust systems which
take into account the two weaknesses identified above. In [41], the authors discussed the use
of weighted referral graphs to decide which referred agent to use. In such a graph, agents
are linked based on the agents that each agent refers to for a given query Q. The requesting
agent and the agent or agents to which it is ultimately referred will be linked, indirectly,
by one or more referral chains, each containing one or more intermediary referring agents.
Each referral (edge) and agent (vertex) is assigned a weight, with the requesting agent
initially being assigned a weight of 1, and referrals being assigned weights representing the
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Figure 5.1: An example of the usage of weighted referral graphs used in [40].
relative trust the the corresponding referring agent has in a referred agent. However, as
we understand the model, there are no restrictions on the value of any of these weights.
The weight of every other agent along a referral chain is the product of the edge weights
between the requesting agent and the instant agent. The implicit assumption (i.e., not
explicitly stated in [41]) seems to be that if we assign a weight of x to an agent a1, and a1
likewise assigns a weight of y to a2, then the weight that we should apply to a2 should be
the product of these two values, or xy – and so on with additional agents if required. If
there are multiple referral chains leading to a single agent, the weight will then be the sum
of the individual weights of these referral chains, as the fact that multiple referral chains
exist should indicate that the referred agent is more likely to be trustworthy.
For example, assume that an agent ar receives two referrals to a particular agent a0,
one through agent a1, and another through agents a2 and a3. The weight of the ar to
a1 referral is 0.4, and that of the a1 to a0 referral is 0.5, leading to an overall weight of
0.5× 0.4 = 0.2 for that chain. If the weights for the chain going through ar, a2, a3, and a0
are 0.5, 0.6, and 0.5, the chain will likewise have an overall weight of 0.15. The weight of a0
will then be the sum of these two chains, or 0.35. (A diagram of this example is provided
in Figure 5.1.)
However, we note that a direct application of this approach to trust models such as
PTM or TRAVOS would be problematic. In this aggregation approach, if there are multiple
chains all referring to the same advisor, these weights will be summed together without
any normalization to yield the overall weight for that agent. Although this ensures that
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agents receiving multiple referrals will be weighed more heavily, it also means that the
agent weights w will not necessarily restricted be to the range 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. This makes
sense in the context of weights, which need not necessarily be bounded to such a range.
However, given that such a range is assumed for trust values such as those in PTM, direct
application is not appropriate.
Later work from the same research group [35], based in part on the work of Jøsang
[12], provided the basis of a more rigorous approach to combining trust values by defining
two operators, concatenation and aggregation. To do so, trust is first defined as a triple
〈b, d, u〉, with the three values respectively representing the belief (positive trust), disbelief
(negative trust), and uncertainty associated with a particular entity; this in turn is derived
using a transform Z(〈r, s〉), where the pair of numbers 〈r, s〉 represents the positive and
negative evidence for that entity.
We first look at their method for concatenating trust along a path. Suppose that
agent ar holds trust M1 = 〈b1, d1, u1〉 in another agent a1. Meanwhile a1 holds trust
M2 = 〈b2, d2, u2〉 in a2. Then, using the concatenation operator ⊗, ar’s trust in a2 may be
represented as M = M1 ⊗M2 = 〈b, d, u〉 where:
b = b1b2
d = b1d2
u = 1− b1b2 − b1d2
We explain each of these values in plainer terms as follows:
• As in [41], ar’s belief in a2 is equivalent to the intersection of ar’s belief in a1, and
a1’s belief in a2, and thus the value of that belief is the product of these two belief
values.
• Similarly, ar’s disbelief in a2 is equivalent to the intersection of ar’s belief that a1 is
trustworthy, and a1’s disbelief in a2’s trustworthiness.
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• The concatenated uncertainty is calculated as being anything other than the two
joint beliefs just noted. The key insight in this regard is that if ar does not believe
a1, then ar believes that a1 is uncertain regarding whether a2 is trustworthy; thus
this component (d1) is not included in the calculation of d. [12].
To combine trust models from multiple agents (or paths), an aggregation operator, ⊕,
is suggested. Essentially this is performed by finding 〈r, s〉 = Z−1(〈b, d, u〉) for each of the
trusts, summing the respective r and s values, and finding the overall triple 〈b, d, u〉 given
these sums.
Even more recent work from that group [8] suggested an apparently improved method
for concatenation. In essence it discounts the evidence in the later “link” by the belief held
in the earlier one – that is:
M = M1 ⊗M2
= 〈b, d, u〉
= Z(〈b1r2, b1s2〉)
where 〈r2, s2〉 = Z−1(M2). The aggregation operator from the earlier paper was carried
over as-is in the more recent work.
Certainly, the concatenation in [35] of the “positive” trust value b of a chain as the
product of the individual values of b seems to be consistent with the other works studied
in this section. At first glance, both the aggregation operator in that work and the revised
concatenation formula in [8] also appear potentially useful for our purposes.
However, we note that both PTM and TRAVOS already have their own methods of
translating the positive and negative evidence obtained through the interactions between
agents into a trust value. These methods are significantly more complex than the trans-
formations used in these papers, and are not easily invertible, meaning we cannot readily
insert them into the operators described therein. Although we could still use these methods
by applying the transformations referred to above, the resulting 〈r, s〉 pairs would likely
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bear no resemblance to the actual data obtained, and as a result we would be reluctant to
apply this method directly.
The same group has also suggested a means of trust-based recommendations based on
graph similarity [7]. In this method, a trust network is modelled as a directed weighted
graph of agents, and may be represented by an adjacency matrix with trust, in which
values are zero if no trust relationship exists, or the trust value if such a relationship
does exist (as opposed to the standard adjacency matrix which contains only zeroes and
ones). From this we can calculate a similarity matrix between this trust network and a
standard structure graph representing the desired relationship – that is, if a1 trusts a2 and
a2 trusts a3, then a1 also trusts a3. Essentially, higher similarity scores between agents
should indicate more useful advisors. That said, the paper gives no additional insight on
how much the recommended agent should be trusted, and so it is not directly comparable
to the other metrics examined in this section.
The EigenTrust algorithm [16] also uses aggregation of local trust values in a slightly
different manner to that explored in [41]. It first defines a local trust value, sij, held by a
peer i with respect to another peer j, as the number of satisfactory transactions that i has
had with j (or sat(i, j)), subtracted by the number of unsatisfactory transactions between
the two peers (unsat(i, j)):
sij = sat(i, j)− unsat(i, j) (5.1)





Note that the special case of
∑
j max(sij, 0) = 0 – that is, peer i has not previously
had any interactions – is handled in EigenTrust by setting cij = 1/|P |, where P is the set
of peers known to be pre-trusted by peer i, if j ∈ P and cij = 0 otherwise.
The overall trust that peer i holds in another peer k, based on i asking its friends, can






This method can thus effectively aggregate trust values along multiple paths – although
as it uses a weighted average, unlike the proposal in [41], it will not provide any real “bonus”
for multiple referrals. On the other hand, it does not directly handle “referral” chains using
more than one intermediate agent – the intent is to get information about a single target
agent, ag, based on the reported direct experiences of all agents (other than the requesting
agent and ag itself) with ag.
To handle asking the friends of friends (and so on), EigenTrust uses a slightly more
complex form. We first rewrite Equation 5.3 in matrix notation, by defining a matrix
C = [cij], a vector ~ti containing the values tik, and ~ci as the normalized local trust vector
of peer i. Thus:
~ti = C
T ~ci (5.4)
If we wish to consider friends of friends, we could compute ~ti = (C
T )2~ci, and so on;
ultimately, if we wish to compute the trust values considering the entire network, we
would compute ~ti = (C
T )n~ci for n = large. The eventual determination of this vector
in EigenTrust requires additional computations that are not within the scope of this cur-
rent discussion. Nevertheless, we will provide a simple example that demonstrates the
functionality of the simplified “asking friends” version discussed above.
Consider the network shown in Figure 5.2. Each edge points from one agent that has
made requests to another agent which received the particular set of requests. Adjacent
to the edge, the numbers of satisfactory (sat) and unsatisfactory (unsat) requests are
indicated. We assume, for purposes of simplification, that the interactions shown represent
the only relevant interactions that have occurred among this set of agents. As in the earlier
example, one agent ar wishes to determine how much it should trust a target agent a0.
Given that ar has not previously interacted with a0, using Equation 5.2 it would calculate
its normalized local trust value for a0 to be cr0 = 0.
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Figure 5.2: An example to illustrate a simplified EigenTrust “asking friends” mechanism.
If ar wishes to calculate its trust in a0 based on asking its friends, it will first calculate
the appropriate “raw” and normalized local trust values, using Equations 5.1 and 5.2. The
pertinent values are shown in Table 5.1.
Then ar’s model of the trustworthiness of a0 would be:
tr0 = cr1c10 + cr2c20 + cr3c30
= (0)(1) + (0.625)(0.429) + (0.375)(0.2)
= 0.343
5.3.2 Proposed Alternatives
Based on this research, we now suggest five alternative methods of modelling the trust-
worthiness of referred advisors, for future consideration and comparison. We reiterate that
these alternatives only affect the specific trustworthiness values assigned to each referred
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Table 5.1: Calculations of Normalized Local Trust Values for Simplified EigenTrust Ex-
ample
ai aj sat unsat sij max(sij, 0)
∑
j max(sij, 0) cij
ar
a1 4 6 -2 0
8
0
a2 7 2 5 5 0.625
a3 6 3 3 3 0.375
a1 a0 5 2 3 3 3 1
a2
a0 4 1 3 3
7
0.429
a1 3 1 2 2 0.286
a3 5 3 2 2 0.286
a3
a0 5 4 1 1 5
0.2
a2 4 0 4 4 0.8
advisor; alternative means of actually choosing these advisors, beyond the method noted
in Section 4.1, are beyond the scope of our current work.
The first method is using the buyer’s original trust value for the referred advisor in
question – the method we used throughout Chapter 4. This is true to the “personalized”
approach that motivates PTM but, as noted, does not take into account the trust that other
advisors have in the referred advisor, perhaps reducing the effectiveness of such referrals.
The second method is simply using the product of all of the trust values in the first
referral chain found leading to the referred advisor. For example, if b is referred to a0 via
a1 and a2, and we define tb1 to be the existing trust that b has in a1 (and similarly for the
remaining links), then t∗b0 = tb1t12t20.







For the fourth method, we return to our discussion of EigenTrust. While the trust
measure used in that mechanism differs somewhat from that used in PTM or TRAVOS
– in the latter methods, the trust values used are already normalized to a value between
zero and one – we feel that this nevertheless provides some inspiration as to how we could
normalize the trust values held when aggregating multiple trust values for the same advisor.
Specifically, we will seek to determine a weighted average of the trust values for the referred
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advisor, in which these trust values are weighted by how much the buyer trusts the chain
that referred this advisor.
To do so, we first define the concept of chain trust as the overall trust that the buyer
holds in the chain of advisors, not including the final “link” (referral) to the referred
advisor, ak. Thus it is equal to the product of the trust values in the chain except for that
of the ultimate referral to ak. For example, in the example above in which b is referred to
a0 via a1 and a2, then the value of the chain trust for that referral chain is equal to tb1t12.
Consider that an advisor ai has received one or more referrals to some other advisor
ak and is seeking to update the trust it should have in ak, given ai’s existing trust in ak,
which we will define as tik, as well as all of the chains of advisors referring to ak and the
trust values in each of those chains. We define each j as representing one such chain of
advisors, such that tij is the chain trust that ai holds in j. We could consider ai’s own
prior trust value tik to be the end of such a chain for which tij = 1, as we presume that ai
has complete confidence in itself.









Such a mechanism would accept additional referral chains for a particular advisor that
had already been accepted as a referral, if the said advisor was referred multiple times.
This could be performed by keeping track of a numerator and denominator for each referred
advisor, and calculating the final value once the referral process is complete. At this point
we contemplate that this would only apply to referred advisors; that is, if an advisor am was
part of the buyer’s original advisor network, only the previously-calculated value tbm will
be used, regardless of how many times it is re-considered as part of the referral algorithm.
The final method we would offer is a simplified version of the fourth method, considering







Table 5.2: Summary of Proposed Referral Trust Weighting Methods
Method Trust Metric(s) Used Averaging Method
1 Buyer’s direct trust None











Weighted using chain trust
First referral chain
We summarize the methods outlined above, and their respective features, in Table 5.2.
Since the proposals in this thesis have been discussed to this point in the context of
probabilistic trust models, we also make clear that in adopting any of these methods beyond
the first one, which simply uses the exact values previously calculated under the applicable
trust model, we do not assume that the values represent probabilities that an agent is
trustworthy. The second method does define trust in a referred agent as the product of
several other probabilities, but this would only be a probability itself if we could prove
the component probabilities to be independent of each other, which is beyond the scope
of the present work. The remaining methods use averages (simple or weighted) of trust
values derived using the first two methods, and therefore would not necessarily represent
probabilities.
Examples
We now turn to demonstrating the use of the five methods identified above using a demon-
strative example. A buyer agent b has an advisor network consisting of three advisor
agents, a1, a2, and a3. Four additional agents, a4 through a7, are included in successive
advisor networks. The pertinent relationships between the agents are shown in Figure 5.3.
Although some of the agents may appear to have small advisor networks, we assume that
any additional relationships may exist in addition to those indicated here, but that these
are not pertinent to our calculations (for example, a2 having b as an advisor).
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Figure 5.3: The pertinent relationships and trust values held in the examples discussed in
Section 5.3.2.
Arrows are used to indicate that the agent at the start of the arrow holds the indicated
trust value in the agent being pointed at. Solid-line arrows indicate that the agent being
pointed to is included in the advisor network of the agent at which the arrow originates;
dashed-line arrows used to indicate pertinent values that were previously calculated, where
the agent being pointed to is not included in the other agent’s advisor network. For
example, it is shown that b calculated a trustworthiness value of 0.5 for agent a7, but has
not included it in its advisor network, whereas it has selected a1, a2, and a3. Finally, for
the advisors, a solid-line border indicates that the agent has had sufficient experience with
the seller under consideration to be included in determining the trustworthiness for that
seller; a dashed-line border specifies that the experience is insufficient to be included in
these calculations.
Regardless of the referral weighting method used, the process of selecting the advisors is
the same – that is, the method outlined in Section 4.1. The buyer will examine each of the
agents in its advisor network, from most trustworthy to least, to determine whether each
is suitable to be included in calculating the trustworthiness of the specified seller. If not,
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the advisor’s own advisor network will be searched for an acceptable replacement advisor.
If this fails to yield a replacement – because all of those advisors were either unsuitable
themselves, or already counted as part of the advisor network – then the advisors of the
advisors just considered will be examined, and so on until either a suitable replacement
has been found, or some pre-determined (currently arbitrary) maximum number of levels
has been reached.2
In this case, advisor a1, with the highest trustworthiness (0.9), will be the first to
be examined, and will accepted due to having the required amount of experience with the
seller. It will be assigned 0.9 as its trustworthiness value regardless of the referral weighting
method chosen later in this example.
However, the next advisor to be considered, a2 (with trustworthiness 0.8), will be
rejected as having insufficient experience. In searching for a replacement advisor, the
agents in a2’s own advisor network, a4 and a5, will be similarly rejected. Thus the buyer
will continue with the next level, beginning with the advisor network of a4, which a2 had
determined to be most trustworthy (0.8) among the agents in its advisor network. The
first agent in a4’s network will be a6, which it trusts with value 0.8. Since a6 has had
sufficient experience with the seller, the buyer will accept a6 as the replacement agent for
a2 when dealing with this particular seller.
Finally we turn to a3, the last agent in b’s advisor network, which is trusted by b with
value 0.7. Here, once again, we recognize that a3 will not have sufficient experience to
be included in the current calculations. Looking at a3’s advisor network, we see that it
too includes a5, which (as discussed in the previous step) will have insufficient experience
to be used as a replacement advisor. This brings us to a5’s advisor network. The buyer
first looks at a5’s most trusted advisor, a6 – although the buyer cannot accept it again as
a replacement advisor, it may be able to obtain additional useful information (depending
on the weighting method used). Finally we see that a5 also has a7 in its advisor network.
As a7 also has had sufficient experience with the seller under consideration, it can now be
accepted as the replacement advisor for a3, completing the referral process.
2If and when an acceptable advisor is found during these searches, that advisor will be selected, and
the search will cease at this point – that is, only the first acceptable advisor found will be selected.
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Using Method 1, the buyer relies on the values it had previously calculated when it
considered – but rejected – using a6 and a7 in its own advisor network – which, as indicated
in Figure 5.3, are 0.55 and 0.5, respectively. It can therefore immediately use these values
in its calculations of seller trustworthiness.
With Method 2, the buyer disregards these previously-calculated values, and instead
relies on the chain of advisors used to find each of these new advisors – using the product
of the trust values of the individual links. (This could be accomplished, for example, by
calculating the value recursively on the chain once a suitable replacement is found.) For
the former, the chain is b→ a2 → a4 → a6, so the value used will be 0.8×0.8×0.8 = 0.512.
For the latter advisor, the corresponding chain is b→ a3 → a5 → a7, leading to the value
used being 0.8× 0.75× 0.7 = 0.42.
Method 3 will be a simple average of the values used in the previous two methods.
Thus a6 would be assigned a trustworthiness of (0.55 + 0.512)/2 = 0.531. Likewise, a7
would be assigned a value of (0.5 + 0.42)/2 = 0.46.
In Method 4, we use a weighted average of the agent’s direct trust in the advisor and
all advisor chains leading to that agent found during the referral process. The calculations
are therefore more complex: The implementation must keep track of the overall trust
corresponding to that chain (as in Method 2), which will be used in the numerator, as well
as the “chain trust” leading up to the final link, which will go into the denominator. (It
could thus, for example, keep a running total of both the numerator and denominator for
each referred agent as new referral chains are found.)
With respect to a6, there are, in addition to b’s direct trust value, two referral chains
found during this process: b→ a2 → a4 → a6, and b→ a3 → a5 → a6.
• For b’s direct trust value in a6, the numerator component is simply that value: 0.55.
The denominator component will trivially be 1 – since b will have no reason to doubt
itself, it will have complete confidence in its prior calculation of the direct trust value.
• For the referral chain passing through a2 and a4, the numerator component will be
0.512 (as calculated in Method 2). The denominator component is calculated based
on all of the links save the final one, and thus it will be 0.8× 0.8 = 0.64.
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• Finally for the referral chain that goes through a3 and a5, the numerator component
will be calculated following the procedure in Method 2: 0.7 × 0.65 × 0.8 = 0.364.
The denominator component will be calculated similarly as for the previous referral
chain: 0.7× 0.65 = 0.455.
The final calculation of the trustworthiness value for a6 would be as follows:
0.55 + 0.512 + 0.364
1 + 0.64 + 0.455
= 0.6807
In a similar fashion we can show that the corresponding value for a7 – combining the
direct trust held by b and the single referral chain found via a3 and a5 – will be 0.575.
A casual reader observing these results may justifiably wonder why the values calcu-
lated for a6 and a7 under this method are larger than any of the individual trust values
being combined. The reason for this is that Method 4 is intended to calculate a weighted
average of the trust values directly held in these agents – and not of the overall chained
trust values as calculated in Method 2. More specifically, a4 and a5 have each assigned
a trustworthiness value of 0.8 to a6 (which are then weighted by the “chain trust” values
leading up to each final link). It therefore stands to reason that under this method, the
updated trustworthiness of a6 will be between 0.55 (b’s direct trust) and 0.8 – which it is,
at 0.6807.
Finally we look at Method 5, which is essentially a simplified version of Method 4
making use of only a single referral chain. For a6, this means we ignore the components




Since our referral mechanism only found one referral chain to begin with for a7, the
trustworthiness value for that advisor under Method 5 will be the same as for Method 4:
0.575. We reiterate at this point our comments from Method 4 regarding the calculated
values being above those of either of the individual trust values being averaged, which also
apply to Method 5.
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Discussion
It seems clear that the choice of weighting method may well have a significant impact on
how trust is modelled when using referrals – and hence upon the accuracy of trust modelling
when referrals are applied. At this time we opt to leave an experimental comparison among
these methods to future work. However, we believe that testing these five methods should
be fairly straightforward: Given one or more scenarios where the other parameters (i.e.
size of the advisor population, percentage of lying advisors, max nbors or thresholding
parameter, and NRE value if applicable) are held constant, test all five of these methods
using the testing procedure documented in Section 5.1.1, and determine which one yields
the lowest mean absolute error in modelling the trust of sellers. A small handful of these
scenarios – perhaps two values for each of the parameters just mentioned – should be
sufficient to indicate the best method(s).
We believe there may also be some merit in further examination of recommendations
based on graph similarity [7], in regards to selecting which agents to be referred. While
we reiterate that this discussion does not really focus on trust propagation so much as
using trust and similarity to select appropriate agents, this does seems to be a promising
alternative means of choosing referred advisors, and could likely be implemented quite
easily with the models discussed in this thesis, as an alternative means of obtaining referrals.
We could compare this to our existing referral-selection mechanism – and potentially others
– to determine whether modifying the mechanism has any effect on the accuracy of trust
modelling. That having been said, we will also leave this to future work.
Finally, particularly for referral chains, we may also wish to consider the appropriateness
of applying a decay factor to the trust value of a referred advisor based on the length of
the chain that provides that referral. Similar to the forgetting factor used in the PTM and
discussed in Section 2.1.1, the calculated trust value would be multiplied by λn, where λ
is the decay factor (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) and n is the length of the referral chain. This would reflect
the belief that an agent that is referred by one of the requesting agent’s existing advisors
should be more trustworthy than one referred by one of the advisor’s advisors (and so on).
Although some decay does occur along a referral chain, it is possible, for instance, that
an advisor referred by a chain of two agents, each trusting each other with a value of 0.8
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(0.83 = 0.512), would end up being assigned greater weight than an existing advisor with
a trust value of 0.5. If such an occurrence is not desired, a decay factor will be required in
order to prevent it.
5.4 Balancing Similarity and Reputation Modelling
In light of the fact that techniques used in CF recommender systems helped inspire the
proposals documented in this thesis, we wish to touch briefly on some of the other research
incorporating both trust modelling and recommendations.
A common theme in recent research has been recommender systems where trust is the
primary criterion — although, in many cases, this has essentially taken the form of a CF-
style recommender with the correlation-based weightings replaced with trustworthiness-
derived values. In fact, some researchers have referred to this as “trust-based” or “trust-
aware” CF [18][21], although more commonly, CF is solely used in regards to correlation-
based recommenders.
Perhaps the best known version of these is the work by Massa et al. [1][21][22]. Their
goal was to use trust-based recommendations to help resolve the data sparsity issue; that
is, if a user (particularly a new user) has few items commonly-rated with other users, then
it may be difficult to determine similarities with these users and hence make recommen-
dations. Trust in this case was based primarily on explicit statements from agents, which
could then be propagated to a pre-defined depth using a selected trust metric.
In their study [22], the more classical similarity-based CF recommender was tested
against two trust metrics, the graph-based local trust metric MoleTrust [1] and the global
metric PageRank [25], using the epinions.com dataset. As well, MoleTrust was tested
using different levels of trust propagation. Their results indicated that even before trust
propagation was applied, the mean average user error (MAUE, as defined in [22]) using
trust as the criterion was significantly lower than with traditional CF (0.790 vs. 0.938).
Adding propagation using MoleTrust served to improve the coverage, although the error
increased slightly as well; meanwhile PageRank generally served only to increase the error.
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The authors then proceeded to examine a system combining trust and user similarity,
finding that although the coverage was better that for the two metrics used individually,
the error was between that of the two “pure” metrics, indicating little benefit of such a
combination.
A similar but more implicit approach to trust was taken in [18]. As with [22], trust is
used in place of similarity to weight the ratings of other agents. Here, however, an agent’s
measure of its trust in another agent is based primarily on the amount of information the
second agent provides, but is also varied based on the quality of that information (that is,
how closely their ratings matched). In choosing the best set of advisors for predictions,
this study takes note of the thresholding approach but instead dismisses it on the basis
that such a selection is a “difficult decision”. Instead they use k-nearest-recommenders
(kNR), a variant of max nbors (which is also known as k-nearest-neighbours, or kNN)
that dynamically selects the best k neighbours that are able to provide information about
a particular desired item.
The experimental results (run on the MovieLens dataset) indicate better coverage for
the trust-based model as opposed to (similarity-based) correlation filtering, as well as lower
prediction error for small values of k. However, as k increases, while accuracy improves
for both methods, eventually the trust-based approach falls behind traditional CF. The
authors hypothesize that since the neighbourhood in the trust-based method will grow to
include more agents that the current user has had little experience with, greater error will
result.3
We will consider future possibilities for linking collaborative filtering techniques and
trust modelling, in light of this past work, in Section 6.2.6.




Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Contributions
In this thesis, we have outlined three potential improvements to trust modelling – trust-
worthiness thresholding, maximum number of advisors, and advisor referrals – all of which
aim to improve the accuracy of the recommendations for trustworthy agents derived from
a buyer’s advisors. These three improvements can be used with different trust modelling
methods, specifically the Personalized Trust Model and the TRAVOS model, as demon-
strated in our study. We have also demonstrated that our proposed approach is sufficiently
robust that it can be applied to offer improvements, even to large-sized populations of
agents.
We have seen that either using trustworthiness thresholding or setting a maximum
number of advisors will provide an improvement to the accuracy of the trust model. We
have also seen that, in cases where the size of the advisor network is very small, using
referrals may help to further improve the accuracy of this model.
In Sections 3.3.3 and 4.3.4, we evaluated our three optimization methods with a larger
population. Our experimental results for PTM show that trustworthiness thresholding is
not affected by the population size, while the proper parameter for the max nbors method
can be selected as a proportion of the population size. For TRAVOS, however, it appears
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that these parameters will need to be set separately for each population. Meanwhile, in
larger populations, allowing for advisor referrals will have a greater benefit when used with
more restricted advisor networks, as compared to the fairly modest improvements seen
with smaller populations.
We note that other trust researchers have also explored ideas related to thresholding
and max nbors. As we discussed in Section 5.4, some trust researchers have examined the
use of kNR, a variant of max nbors (or kNN), in connection with a trust-based collabora-
tive filtering recommender [18]. Meanwhile, the original version of PTM uses an implicit
threshold in its computation of seller trustworthiness: it only makes use of “trustworthy”
advisors, which are defined as those having trustworthiness values of 0.5 or above [42].
However, we should distinguish between the arbitrary (if intuitive) selection of parame-
ters in [42], and to a lesser extent in [18],1 and the more careful methodologies for selecting
parameters outlined in [9] (for collaborative filtering) and in this work (for trust mod-
elling). In both works, simulations were conducted using several different parameters for
all the methods examined – thresholding, max nbors, and (in our case) referrals – and the
authors attempted to draw conclusions based on those results. Indeed, in considering the
results in Section 3.3.1, it seems clear that the “intuitive” threshold used for the PTM in
[42] was not the best one.
This seems to point towards the overall benefits of using a more principled methodology
for selecting parameters in trust systems: while an arbitrary choice may work fine, there
may be something better, given other parameters such as agent population size. Such a
methodology may also help to demonstrate more robustly the benefits of the model and
the specific parameter choices used therewith.
We have also observed other work relating to finding the “best” size of a social network.
For example, Seth [29] examined the creation of clusters of users with close ties, such as
interests in similar topics, in participatory-media social networks such as Orkut. He argued
that the amount of contextualization that occurs in a community is proportional to the
size of the cluster, and observed that a larger cluster size will generally result in a greater
1The experimental verification for kNR included simulations using several values for k, but did not
test the full range of possible k values exhaustively. Many of the subsequent experiments simply assumed
k = 1, even though it was not the best performer in terms of minimizing error.
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amount of information being generated in that cluster. At the same time, the author
notes past observations suggesting that a group with more than 150 members might be
unsustainable [3], and suggests that adjustments might be necessary above this point.
Our results seem to concur with this work insofar as increases to the size of the advisor
network do not always result in improved results in terms of trust modelling accuracy:
a very small group is not advisable, but after a certain point, further increases will only
serve to reduce accuracy. However, that comparison should be taken with a grain of salt, in
that the clusters discussed in [29] are of users that have consciously decided to join a group
based on similar interests. By contrast, even though the agents in PTM or TRAVOS might
represent actual human actors, it is these models, in combination with our techniques, that
will determine the advisor network of each buyer agent, not the actors themselves.
The positive results outlined in this thesis do suggest that other researchers should
be able to adopt these optimizations when seeking to improve their own trust models.
Towards this end, we have also clarified, in Section 5.1, the experimental framework which
can be used to derive appropriate parameter values.
6.2 Future Work
We believe this thesis provides a solid foundation for the usage of network limiting and
advisor referral techniques for improving trust modelling in multi-agent systems. We iden-
tify below some of the open questions which remain with respect to the application of our
work.
6.2.1 Parameter Selection
In Chapters 3 and 4 we conducted simulations aimed at not only verifying the usefulness
of our techniques, but also at finding, in a methodological fashion, the best parameters
to use for our techniques for the given situation. We expounded on this methodology in
Section 5.1.
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There are of course many ways we could improve on this methodology. For example,
in our simulations, we normally chose to vary the max nbors parameter in increments of
10, and the threshold parameter in increments of 0.05 or 0.1. It could be worthwhile to
implement an iterative approach to finding the “best” value. For example, if we initially
use increments of 10 and determine that max nbors = 40 works best, we might repeat the
simulations for increments of 2 between 30 and 50, and so on until the best value is found.2
Identifying a precise “best” value is not particularly relevant to the main conclusions of
this thesis, but future researchers seeking to benefit from our results may wish to bear this
in mind.
For referrals, the main parameter examined in this thesis was NRE, the minimum
number of experiences that an advisor would need to have with a seller in order to be used
in determining the trustworthiness of that seller. However, there may be superior ways
of determining the amount of experience between a seller and an advisor. For example,
at present the referral procedure does not take into account the length of time that has
elapsed since a particular experience – it stands to reason that experiences that happened
in the distant past may not count for very much, especially if the seller’s behaviour has
changed over time. It may also be useful to consider how factors such as the dynamicity
of the community or the amount of knowledge held by the buyer and/or other advisors
might affect these selections.
Future research should also certainly consider the maximum number of levels searched
when a referral is needed. Presently, this value is set as maxnetlevel = dlogk(|B|)e, as
an estimation of the number of levels required in order to search the entire population of
advisors. Reducing this number may serve to improve the performance of referrals, albeit
potentially at the expense of some useful information from some referred advisors that
might no longer be identified. It might be useful therefore to examine how many referred
advisors are found at each level, and how much their presence affects the modelling of seller
trustworthiness.
2Alternatively we could use a binary search algorithm to identify the best parameter, assuming we
could show that the graph would have a global minimum and no local minima (based on our results in
Chapter 3, this seems to be the case for PTM, but not necessarily for TRAVOS).
100
6.2.2 Improvements to Testing Methods
It would be useful to test our techniques on “real” data sets – that is, data originating from
real users – and not arbitrary data as performed in the simulations in Chapters 3 and 4.
For example, the work on collaborating filtering design choices [9], mentioned earlier as an
inspiration for some of our techniques, used the MovieLens database to help determine how
useful various methods would be. Potentially more useful for our purposes would be the
epinions.com dataset, in which users not only provided reviews of items, but also defined
a “Web of Trust” consisting of users whose reviews they found to be consistently useful,
and a “block list” of reviewers who were consistently not useful [21]. Testing against a
dataset of this type could help us to show the robustness of our techniques in a real-world
scenario.
An additional beneficial extension to our testing would be to make the advisor networks
dynamic, changing over time as agents become more or less trustworthy. Our verification
in this thesis simply created a “static” advisor network after a training period, and did
not consider the effects of potential subsequent interactions. However, in a real-world use
case, we would expect the advisor network, and trust values, to be regenerated or updated
from time to time, perhaps every few days, as agents engage in additional transactions,
and as new agents enter the environment. We might, for instance, regularly update the
trust values associated with existing advisors, and replace the least trustworthy existing
advisors with new, more trustworthy agents.
As noted previously, our work in this thesis has examined the effect of our techniques
on two trust models: the PTM and TRAVOS. We felt that although there are many simi-
larities between these models, such as the usage of beta distributions, they were sufficiently
distinct to show that our techniques, and the results of their use, should not be specific
to any specific model. However, it is by no means a comprehensive study, even among
probabilistic trust models. In particular we note the recent contribution by Vogiatzis et al.
[34] which is claimed to be, unlike the others, a “fully probabilistic” trust model, modelling
agent interactions using a Hidden Markov Model, and apparently making no use of beta
distributions. We leave consideration of such matters to future research.
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6.2.3 Further Verification of Effects on TRAVOS
In Sections 3.3.2, 3.3.3, and 4.3.3, we looked at the effects of the application of our tech-
niques on the TRAVOS trust model. However, our results did not seem to be as clear-cut
as those for the PTM. In particular, we noted that the figures showing the initial results for
TRAVOS for max nbors and thresholding, Figures 3.4a and 3.4b respectively, displayed
graphs with a zig-zag shape, whereas the graphs for PTM (Figures 3.3a and 3.3b) had a
relatively smooth shape.
Because of the way advisor trustworthiness is modelled with TRAVOS – taking into ac-
count the buyer, the advisor, and the seller under consideration, whereas the corresponding
computations for the PTM are independent of the seller – it would be valuable to control
additional criteria in our simulations that have not been held constant in our research to
date, and to then examine any effects on the simulations. These criteria might include the
total number of ratings received by each seller, and the overall percentage of unfair ratings
from the advisors that interact with each seller. Again, we leave this for future research.
In addition, we could determine more carefully the circumstances under which TRAVOS
is challenged in properly determining the trustworthiness of advisors. A useful starting
point for this investigation would be the comparison of probabilistic approaches performed
in [44].
Finally, we might examine if the proposal in the following subsection of a unified advisor
network for TRAVOS might affect our results going forward.
6.2.4 Additional Work with Large Populations
In Section 3.3.3 we examined the effect of increasing the advisor population size when
using the PTM with either max nbors or thresholding. We showed that these techniques
will have approximately the same effect on the larger population, if the threshold or the
proportionate max nbors value is kept constant. However, our results with TRAVOS in
that section diverged from this, appearing to show that a given threshold or proportionate
max nbors value will yield different results for different advisor populations. Of course,
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this may be less a matter of the large populations themselves than one of issues with the
TRAVOS model itself, as just discussed in Section 6.2.3, but this is not entirely clear at
this stage.
Although we intended to test as well the effects of referrals on the large population
scenario in TRAVOS, we found this to be impractical, since increasing the population
using TRAVOS seems to have a much more significant effect on the amount of required
memory compared to the PTM. This is in part because the modelling of advisor trust in
TRAVOS takes into account not only the buyer and advisor, but also the specific seller
being considered. This in turn means that, to allow each buyer / advisor to determine its
own advisor network, they must in fact create separate networks for each potential seller.
This means that in an environment having 100 sellers and making use of advisor networks,
TRAVOS may require up to 100 times as much memory as would an otherwise identical
scenario in PTM.
This was not a significant issue when thresholding and max nbors alone are tested,
since the advisor networks of the advisors themselves have no effect on the simulations
in these cases and thus could be ignored. However, since this component is crucial to the
functioning of our referral mechanism, we may need to examine ways to reduce the memory
usage in these cases, or alternatively determine a means to collapse the separate advisor
networks used for each seller into a single advisor network as used with PTM.
Returning to the results in Section 3.3.3, we noted that notwithstanding the similarity
in the general effects of our techniques for both of the advisor population sizes we tested,
the larger population tended to perform slightly better – that is, it almost always had
lower MAE than the comparable small-population results. We posited that this was simply
because more highly-trusted advisors were available in the larger population, yielding more
trustworthy information about each of the sellers.
As a suggestion for future work, we would verify this by re-running the simulations,
this time keeping track of the trustworthiness values of each advisor, and then sorting the
advisors into several trustworthiness bins (e.g. five bins of [0, 0.2), [0.2, 0.4), . . . [0.8, 1]).
We hypothesize that the higher-population simulations would yield more advisors in the
high-trustworthiness bins than those for the smaller advisor populations.
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6.2.5 Performance and Time Sensitivity
One topic which would be promising to explore is improving the performance of the trust
models when using our proposed methods. Given that these methods will in many cases
substantially reduce the size of the advisor network used to produce the trust model of
sellers, some performance optimization of these methods could help to improve the overall
performance of the trust model.
Zhang also suggested [42] that it may be useful to apply the PTM (and presumably
other trust models) to time-sensitive tasks which may require a buyer to make a very
quick decision – for example, vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs), which might need to
consider information from various sources regarding weather, traffic, and road conditions,
all of which is changing constantly. Perhaps a more pertinent example in the e-commerce
scenario would be a time-limited online auction marketplace, in which bidders may place
or increase their bids at any point up until the specified end time. An agent might wish to
decide, for instance, how worthwhile placing or increasing a bid would be, given not only
the agent’s own worth of the item, but also the updated trustworthiness of the seller and
of other bidders (i.e. detecting collusion).
In such a scenario, Zhang argued, an agent might only have time to consult a limited
number of advisors. We note, however, with specific regard to the models and modifications
studied in this thesis, that the time required of querying advisors is quite small compared
to the amount of time required to model the trustworthiness of, and select, advisors.
Our instinct is that a “good enough” model of the trustworthiness of an agent might be
sufficient – perhaps one only considering a random subset of the advisor population, as in
Section 3.3.4. However, under these circumstances, we would want to have high confidence
in our selection, especially if that selection was a particularly risky one (such as, using the
VANET example, making recommendations about when to change lanes).
Our review of the literature has not revealed any significant past work on time-sensitive
decisions in the context of trust modelling. Although a number of researchers have dis-
cussed “time sensitivity” in the context of trust modelling in peer-to-peer networks, includ-
ing [19][6][2], the references to time sensitivity relate to the use of models incorporating
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time-slots to keep track of when events occur, and not time-sensitive decisions.
6.2.6 Combining Collaborative Filtering and Trust Modelling
In Section 5.4, we mentioned that several other researchers have proposed methods of in-
corporating CF techniques into trust modelling or vice versa. In many cases these involved
simply substituting trust as the primary metric in place of similarity [21]. We noted one
novel method in the literature used for “trust-based collaborative filtering”, known as k-
nearest recommenders (kNR), which dynamically selects the best k neighbours that are
able to provide information about a particular desired item [18].
It appears that kNR may be a useful alternative to the thresholding and max nbors
methods we outlined in Chapter 3, and in that regard, future research could include exam-
ination of kNR’s performance, in terms of both trust modelling accuracy and computation,
compared to the other two methods when applied to the same environment. This would
necessitate a more complex experimental environment, with different items (with different
corresponding trustworthiness values) sold by each seller.
There is perhaps, however, a larger question relating to potentially considering both
similarity and trust when it comes to deciding which agents to interact with. Conceivably
we could attempt to combine the measures in some fashion, but this might not be partic-
ularly helpful in all cases. Consider for instance an agent that has low trustworthiness but
very high similarity to the buyer, or vice versa – would this agent be used as an advisor in
this scenario, and if so, will it serve to help or harm the buyer?
A potentially more useful approach might be to use a dual-stage determination. For
instance, we could set two thresholds, one representing the minimum trustworthiness for
an advisor to have, and another stating the minimum similarity the advisor must have
with the buyer; an advisor would then have to pass both thresholds to be accepted into
the advisor network. This too would require an experimental environment considering not
only generic interactions between buyers and sellers, but also the specific types of items
being transferred (and the characteristics thereof). This we leave to future work as well.
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6.2.7 Information Gain
Work has also been done on the measure of information gain obtained as more agents are
introduced into a trust or reputation system, which may be an additional factor to consider
when determining how large the size of the advisor network should be.
For example, Sierra and Debenham [31] suggest the following formula to predict the
amount of information ItXi(α, β, µ), with respect to some probability distribution Xi, ob-
tained when a message µ is obtained at time t:
ItXi(α, β, µ) = H
t(Xi)−Ht(Xi(µ)) (6.1)
where H(•) is Shannon entropy, α is a (requesting) agent (i.e., a buyer), and β is one
of the negotiating agents that interacts with α (i.e., a potential seller).
Many of our results in this thesis indicated that, when varying the max nbors or thresh-
olding parameter slightly in close proximity to the “optimal” values, there was little change
to the computed trust modelling error – the error had “bottomed out”. This would pre-
sumably indicate that the information gain by adding or removing advisors around these
optimal points would be minimal. Thus work along these lines – specifically, determination
of parameters for which the instantaneous information gain is minimal – might allow us
to compute, in a more deterministic fashion, the appropriate parameters for max nbors or
thresholding.
6.2.8 Usefulness of Referrals
In Chapter 4, we outlined a proposed technique for incorporating an advisor referral system
into the trust models being studied; however, our experimental results thus far have had
mixed results. In Section 4.3.2, we noted that the use of our referral mechanism yields
improvements in trust-modelling accuracy when the advisor network had been limited to
a very small number of advisors – as would occur if a small max nbors value (e.g. 10 or
below) was set, or thresholding was applied using a very high threshold (e.g. 0.8 or above).
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On the other hand, if the best max nbors or threshold parameter – as found through
experimental determination – had been used instead, the improvements would be signifi-
cantly lessened. Indeed, using a more carefully-set max nbors or threshold parameter, even
without referrals, will still yield significantly better trust-modelling accuracy compared to
a very small advisor network with referrals.
That does not, however, mean that referrals are necessarily without merit, since there
may well be practical reasons to reduce the amount of memory that such a program re-
quires.
For example, if a system contains an extremely high agent population – i.e., in the
millions – and a limiting method such as random selection (see Section 3.3.4) proves inef-
fective (for example, if there is high data sparsity), it may well be impractical to maintain a
model of all of the agents unless the network is limited to a very small fraction of the overall
size, either by using a small max nbors value (or proportion) or a very high threshold. It
is also conceivable that some version of this procedure might eventually be incorporated
into embedded systems – i.e., certain types of mobile devices, or devices developed using
nanotechnology – in which it tends to be much more difficult to supply a large capacity for
either storage or random-access memory compared to larger-scale modern workstations.
It would therefore, we believe, be useful to conduct additional research, as future work,
into the potential benefits of using referrals when the available memory is much more
limited. This would depend on whether (a) the use of referrals does (or can be made
to) reduce memory usage – given that although we assume that a smaller advisor network
would be used, the referral process itself requires some memory allocation; and (b) whether
the amount of the resulting reductions is in fact significant compared to the overall memory
consumption of the trust model.
In a similar vein, we could also consider optimizations to the referral mechanism, as
described in pseudo-code in Algorithm 2, to maximize the efficiency of the referrals process
and reduce the information load. For example, if certain advisors are highly trusted by
several agents, one agent could end up being considered multiple times during the referrals
process and rejected each time, due to either the agent having insufficient experience, or the
restrictions on duplicate advisors in a referred network. It might be better, for instance,
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to (a) have each advisor pre-determine the most useful advisors it already has for each
seller, such that when referrals are sought, only the most useful referees for the particular
scenario are provided; and (b) ensure that once the advisor network of a particular advisor
has been examined, it is not re-examined on some deeper level of the network.
6.2.9 Domain Specificity
Finally, it would be useful to consider how the domain under consideration might affect
the choice of both the trust model and the specific methods or parameters used to optimize
it. While we have focused on electronic marketplaces in this paper, other models are used
in different domains – as in modelling the trust between agents collaborating on a health-
related challenge [17] – and the usefulness of our proposed methods may vary from one
domain to the next.
Although it would be impractical to model every possible trust-model domain, we can
still identify certain combinations of characteristics that could serve to represent many of
these domains. For example, motor vehicles tend to have, relative to over consumer goods,
high values, but also exist in relatively low quantities, since a typical consumer would
only need to buy one every few years. Houses and other real estate would have similar
characteristics. In contrast, most food items are only useful for a small number of servings,
and thus must be purchased more regularly – but also exist in higher quantities and have
lower prices. It therefore stands to reason that the trust model used for buying a car might
have very different characteristics from one used for buying household staples.
We expect by identifying the most pertinent characteristics of the relevant domains
and adjusting the simulations accordingly, one could make additional conclusions about






Relationship Between max nbors and
Thresholding
In providing an example scenario applying max nbors and thresholding in Section 3.2.1,
we acknowledged that there is a relationship between these two methods, in that applying
a particular max nbors value to a given scenario will be equivalent to applying some
threshold for the same scenario, and vice versa. We now examine whether or not we could
use such a relationship on a more general basis.
In conducting the simulations outlined in Section 3.3.1, we also kept track of (a) the
size of the generated advisor network, representing the max nbors value that would have
generated the same results; and (b) the minimum trust value of the advisors in the network,
representing the (maximum) threshold that would have generated the given results. We are
primarily concerned with the former with respect to cases where thresholding is applied,
and the latter for instances where max nbors was used.
In Figure A.1a, we indicate, on the y-axis, the average network size that is produced
(i.e. the equivalent max nbors parameter) when different threshold parameters are used
(x-axis), for three different percentages of lying advisors. As expected, we see that as
the applied threshold increases, the equivalent max nbors value decreases. However, the
slopes of the graphs (each representing a particular percentage of lying advisors) are not
consistent, and in each case the bulk of the decrease happens approximately between the
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threshold values of 0.25 and 0.8 (that is, the graphs are fairly flat outside of this range).
We also see, in comparing the three percentages of lying advisors, that the size of the
network will “shrink” more quickly for the 90% lying advisor scenario – that is, the network
will drop to a size of 10 for a threshold of 0.5, whereas a threshold of 0.7 is required to get
a similar size for the 30% and 60% lying advisor cases.
Finally, that when applying a threshold of 0.55 – which we indicated earlier was the best-
performing of the tested thresholds for the 30% and 60% cases – the equivalent max nbors
values are approximately 49 and 30 respectively. While the latter is consistent with the
max nbors value that performed best for those two cases (30), the former is significantly
different, indicating that we cannot blindly “convert” betweenmax nbors and thresholding,
and then expect the results to be equivalent.
In Figure A.1b, we use the y-axis to indicate the average minimum trustworthiness
value, i.e. the equivalent threshold, of the advisors accepted into a network determined
using max nbors (the max nbors parameter being indicated by the x-axis). Once again,
as expected, as the max nbors value is increased, the equivalent threshold of the resulting
network decrease. But we also see once again that the slope is not consistent for any single
graph (i.e. a single percentage of lying advisors), and that the slopes of these graphs differ
from each other as well.
Moreover, in observing the results for a max nbors value of 30, the “best case” for
the 30% and 60% lying advisors cases, we once again see that the resulting equivalent
thresholds are not consistent with the “best case” threshold found for those scenarios,
0.55.
These results suggest to us that max nbors and thresholding should not be considered
interchangeable, particularly if the percentage of dishonest advisors is subject to change.
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(a) Equivalent max nbors values for various thresholding scenarios
(b) Equivalent threshold values for various cases where max nbors was used
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